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INTRODUCTION: THE NEED FOR A NEW PARADIGM TO
ANALYZE GLOBAL MARKET FAILURES

The "globalization" of commerce provides ever-growing opportu
nities for producers, employers, and service providers to shop the
globe for more amenable jurisdictions. While they enjoy a "race to
the top," an international "race to the bottom," spawned by decreas
ing relocation costs, threatens to compromise the achievements of the
welfare state and lower standards of consumer protection. National
governments, weakened by competition that entails leaner budgets,
find it increasingly difficult to cooperate in the appropriation of crucial
shared natural resources, seriously endangering these assets while
damaging the environment. Not only does the growing global compe
tition create both efficiency losses and social-welfare problems, it also
challenges principles of democracy and self-determination. As compe
tition constrains nations' available choices, individuals have fewer op
portunities to play a meaningful role in shaping their lives through the
national collective decisionmaking process.
Largely pessimistic analyses of these collective action challenges
have been dominated by the Westphalian paradigm- a model of in
ternational relations that views global conflicts solely in terms of the
200-some sovereign states that constitute the global arena. The para
digm operates on the still-prevailing premise that nation-states are
unitary actors engaging in international competition.1 Even those
writers who are themselves aware of the diverse domestic forces that
actually shape national policies stop short of identifying the deficien
cies - both descriptive and normative - of the Westphalian para
digm.2
1. Only a few legal scholars look behind the veil of sovereignty to analyze international
agreements - in particular, trade rules - by reference to domestic politics. See Alan 0.
Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1999); Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of the Most Favored Nation
Clause, in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 43 (Jagdeep S. Bhandari &
Alan 0. Sykes eds., 1997); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Trade Policy as a Constitutional Prob
lem:
On the Domestic Policy Functions of International Trade Rules, 41
AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT 405 (1986), reprinted in 1 THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 121 (Robert
Howse ed., 1998). For an analysis of international environmental law from a similar per
spective, see Jonathan Baert Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global Environmental
Regulation, 87 GEO. L.J. 749 {1999).
2. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV.
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This Article argues that the Westphalian paradigm is inadequate:
by focusing exclusively on interstate relations, it obfuscates the crucial
role played by competing domestic interest groups in the international
arena. This Article advocates a different paradigm - the transna
tional conflict paradigm - that better explains various collective ac
tion failures and points the way toward mechanisms that might correct
these problems. At its core lies the observation that states are not
monolithic entities; and that many of the pervasive conflicts of interest
are in fact more internal than external, stemming from the heteroge
neity within, rather than among, states. Indeed, the transnational con
flict paradigm shows how domestic interest groups often cooperate
with similarly situated foreign interest groups in order to impose ex
ternalities on rival domestic groups. The better-organized, and hence
more politically effective, domestic interest groups - usually produc
ers, employers, and service suppliers - cooperate with similar inter
ests in different states to exploit less-organized groups such as con
sumers, employees, and environmentally vulnerable citizens. Thus,
the transnational conflict paradigm attributes many global collective
action failures to conflicts among warring domestic groups rather than
international competition among states.
The transnational conflict paradigm also exposes how crucial con
stitutional and international norms actually perpetuate the power im
balance among rival domestic interest groups. Current norms and
procedures, both constitutional and international, are inherently
slanted in favor of groups with historically stronger domestic political
power. Constitutional and administrative legal scholarship has long
been alert to the observation that public life consists of "competition
among pressure groups for political influence."3 Accordingly, public
choice theorists have analyzed domestic norms, procedures, and insti
tutions as potential tools for regulating this competition. But at the
same time, these scholars paid little attention to the domestic ramifica
tions of international law's laissez-faire framework, which continues to
provide a convenient exit option for those finding domestic controls
too stringent. Producers can evade tight domestic regulations simply
by shifting their activities to a different jurisdiction. In addition, inter-

1501 (1998) (reaching a pessimistic conclusion due to conflicting national policies that result
from the conflicting interests of producers and importers in different states). Other writers
continue to impute interests and expectations to states despite awareness of the heterogene
ity of domestic politics. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of
International Law, 24 YALEJ. INT'LL. l, 20-21 (1999).
3. See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political
Influence, 98 Q. J. ECON. 371 (1983). This institutionalized imbalance went unheeded in in
ternational legal scholarship, perhaps due to the traditional division between constitutional
and international law. A similar departmentalization occurred in political science, with the
emergence of international relations as a separate branch of scholarship. See Helen V. Mil
ner, Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis of International, American, and Com
parative Politics, 52 INT'L ORG. 759, 762-67 (1998).
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national commercial organizations, such as the International Coffee
Organization4 and the International Tin Council,5 enable producers
and importers to perform a "virtual exit," whereby they obtain immu
nity from the jurisdiction of national courts, evade antitrust and other
national regulations, and avoid liability in case of insolvency.6 These
exit options, facilitated by constitutional and international law and
closely guarded by smaller domestic groups, drive the global race to
the bottom as well as other collective action failures.
This Article explores the ramifications of the still dominant West
phalian paradigm from the perspectives of efficiency, democracy, and
equity. It then suggests norms, procedures, and institutions to correct
the current intergroup imbalance, and thereby offers better prospects
for transnational cooperation and more equitable, sustainable, and
democratic management of national and global commons.
'
Part II analyzes the transnational conflict paradigm and examines
how sectarian domestic interests shape international negotiations and
politics, and consequently influence the development of international
law. Part III offers an overview of the systemic outcomes of that sec
tarian influence, namely the establishment and entrenchment of con
stitutional and international norms, procedures, and institutions to se
cure domestic small group influence.
Part IV assesses the
transnational consequences of the dominant, and essentially unregu
lated, role played by small interest groups in the formation of those
norms. It then shows how the resulting legal bias has contributed to
global market failures, current trends away from the welfare state, and
the demise of effective citizen voice in collective decisionmaking. Part
V then develops a theory of transnational institutions that could limit
small interest group capture while offering more effective opportuni
ties for democratic participation in national and transnational deci
sionmaking.
II.

THE SOVEREIGN STATE AS THE AGENT OF SMALL INTEREST
GROUPS

After describing the domestic interaction among the various actors
within the state, this Part applies public choice theory to demonstrate
the relative edge smaller domestic interests enjoy over larger groups in
shaping the outcome of international negotiations. As a result, spe

4. See infra text accompanying notes 63-65.
5. See infra notes 48-49.
6. For a discussion of the immunity of international organizations (!Os), see infra note
48 and accompanying text. For a more thorough discussion of the inapplicability of antitrust
laws and other "long-arm statutes" and the absence of liability of states to IO obligations,
see infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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cific treaties, and international law in general, are skewed in favor of
such groups.7
A.

The Transnational Conflict Paradigm

Political economists long ago demonstrated convincingly that state
institutions provide an effective means for certain domestic interest
groups to exploit less organized domestic groups in the competitive
market for political goods (such as taxes, subsidies, and favorable
market regulation).8 In this market, more organized groups, namely
those composed of a relatively smaller number of individuals, can out
bid larger groups because the former realize both higher per capita
benefits from cooperation with fellow group members and lower costs
of monitoring and sanctioning free riders.9 Hence, other things being
equal, smaller groups, such as producers and employers, will obtain
collective goods more efficiently than larger groups of consumers or
employees, thereby securing a disproportionate share of the aggregate
social welfare while externalizing part of their production costs onto
the larger groups.10
Small groups' greater organizational capabilities also provide them
a competitive edge in obtaining and assessing information on poli
cies.11 More effective monitoring of the government prompts politi
cians and bureaucrats to bias policy in favor of those who can appreci
ate their efforts. The larger body of ill-informed voters hardly notices
7. In fact, the structure of foreign relations and international law ensure even greater
small interest group capture than at the purely domestic level. See discussion infra Part III.
8. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2
MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).

BELL J.

ECON. &

9. As a result, the political influence of groups is inversely related to their size. See
MANCUR OLSON , THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 22-36 (1965). Ethnic, national, ra
cial, and indigenous minorities are usually excluded from this definition of small groups.
Although numerically inferior relative to the larger community, their organizational costs
may be relatively higher than those of the majority. But there may be political circum
stances in which they in fact obtain political influence that outweighs their relative size. See
Bruce A Ackerman, Beyond Carotene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985) (suggesting that
not all minorities are "discrete and insular'').
10. This does not entail that small groups will achieve optimal amounts of a potential
collective good. Collective losses still result from the unequal incentive of individuals within
that group to contribute to the collective effort (determined by the relative stake each indi
vidual has in the collective pie). But it does suggest that "the larger the group, the farther it
will fall short of providing an optimal amount of a collective good." OLSON, supra note 9, at
35.
11. For an explanation of information as a collective good, see Susanne Lohmann, An
Information Rationale for the Power of Special Interests, 92(4) AM. POL. SCI. REV. 809
(1998); see also Michael D. Rosenbaum, Domestic Bureaucracies and the International
Trade Regime: The Law and Economics of Administrative Law and Administratively
Imposed Trade Barriers (Discussion Paper No. 250 1/99, The Center for Law, Economics
and Business, Harvard Law School), available at <http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs
/olin_center> (arguing that administrative procedures that lower the costs of access to in
formation shift power over policymaking from more-organized to less-organized groups).
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their relative loss or attributes it to random factors.12 Thus, the infor
mation rationale suggests that small-group policy bias stems not neces
sarily only from more effective lobbying, but also from more efficient
monitoring of the policies once adopted.13 It also explains the growing
influence of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), which ad
vance the cause of larger groups by promoting, for example, human
rights or protection of the environment. The information they gather
and disseminate improves the effectiveness of monitoring bodies, such
as the legislature, and reduces the incentive to adopt policies that are
biased against the larger groups.14
As Olson elaborates in The Rise and Decline of Nations, because
smaller groups could organize themselves more quickly within the
nascent Westphalian system of sovereign states, they were able to use
the states as instruments for obtaining a disproportionate share of re
sources for themselves.15 Indeed, the political institutions of the
emerging nations reflected just such a skewed power relationship be
tween the smaller and larger groups. Constitutions insulated the
smaller groups' share from majority vote16 without restricting the op
portunities for small groups to influence politicians and bureaucrats.17
Domestic political dynamics (and consequently, transnational po
litical dynamics) involve not only large and small groups vying for po
litical influence, but also the interests and preoccupations of politi
cians, bureaucrats, and judges. Politicians, whose immediate interest
is election or reelection, broker public goods in exchange for campaign
contributions or other political support (in nondemocratic regimes) or
personal financial gains (in nondemocratic regimes). The bureauc12. In developed countries, for example, policies are biased in favor of the relatively few
farmers, whereas in developing countries the large agricultural sector is heavily taxed. See
Becker, supra note 3, at 385.
13.
14.
(1997) .
15.

See Lohmann, supra note 11, at 812.
See

HELEN v. MILNER, INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND INFORMATION 247-48

MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS ch. 3 (1982).

16. Landowners were particularly concerned that a landless majority would use its nu
merical superiority to redistribute property. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison)
(discussing property ownership as a basis for conflict of interests among voters and legisla
tors). The installation of a complex and diversified system of government, supermajority
amendment requirements, and judicial review to protect constitutional rights such as the
right to property responded to such concerns. See id.; THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (Alexander
Hamilton or James Madison) (discussing the political structures for curbing such conflict of
interests), No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining the rationale of judicial review); see
also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Jnterest
Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975) (presenting constitutional guarantees as se
curing legislative deals among diverse interest groups).
17. Marx, of course, made a stronger claim - namely that small groups, the bourgeoisie,
invented the state system to exploit the masses. For Marxist-oriented historiography of the
emergence (and possible demise) of the nation state that corroborates the Olsonian thesis,
see generally ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM (1983) ; ERIC J. HOBSBAWM,
NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780 (2d ed. 1992) .
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racy, on the other hand, if properly insulated from the political system,
is relatively immune to the immediate influence of interest groups;18
judges even more so.19 The relative insulation of bureaucrats and
judges from political influence provides a useful tool for competing in
terest groups. In matters where policy shifts due to fluctuating politi
cal influence are undesirable, groups may agree to establish adminis
trative agencies comprised of bureaucrats independent from political
influence. Thus, for example, by relegating the management of the
national monetary system to administrative agencies - the central
banks - rival domestic groups have solved a difficult collective action
problem.20 Similarly, constitutional guarantees against, for example,
the taking of property have also been used to secure deals among do
mestic groups.21
Greater political independence from interest group influence does
not mean that bureaucrats and judges necessarily pursue what they
deem to be the "national interest" of their state. Their decisions may
reflect certain biases. Thus, in addition to personal status and a com
fortable income, bureaucrats are motivated by an interest in ensuring
for themselves (and their institution) greater budgetary discretion,
thereby gaining latitude to implement policies as they see fit.22 Judges,
on the other hand, hesitate to formulate an independent view of the
"national interest," deferring instead to the visions of politicians and
bureaucrats. Not only do they refrain from imposing any strings on
extraterritorial activity of the government, private citizens, or domes
tic firms; they also find myriad ways to rebuff challenges to such activi18. Of course, bureaucracies in many countries may not be insulated, and hence will
tend to reflect the interests of the politicians and interest groups. Political control of the ap
pointments process is usually the most effective and pervasive way to ensure a submissive
bureaucracy. See Randy Calvert et al., A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion,
33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 588 (1989). But the private market, where many regulators eventually
find themselves, is another powerful source of influence.
19. That is, if the ideal of independence is being observed in fact. See J. Mark
Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 721 (1994) (analyZing systems in which judicial dependency on the political branches
results from the politicians' interest in controlling judges' appointment, assignment, and
promotion).
20. See Geoffrey Garrett & Peter Lange, Internationalization, Institutions and Political
Change, in INTERNATIONALIZATION AND DOMESTIC PoLmcs 48, 66-69 (Robert 0. Keo
hane & Helen V. Milner eds., 1996).
21.

See discussion supra note 16.

22. For an (updated) analysis of bureaucrats' objectives, see WILLIAM A. NISKANEN,
BUREAUCRACY AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 274-75 (1994) (suggesting that bureaucrats tend

to maxintlze the discretionary budgets of their bureaus). See also Ronald Wintrobe, Modem
Bureaucratic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE 429 (Dennis C. Mueller ed.,
1995) [hereinafter PERSPECTIVES]. For a discussion of the private benefits (mainly income,
prestige, and a peaceful life) and the institutional benefits (larger and more discretionary
budgets) that accrue to bureaucrats from participation in international organizations (and
which, in tum, account for their proliferation), see Bruno S. Frey, The Public Choice of In
ternational Organization, in PERSPECTIVES, supra, at 106-23.
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ties despite seemingly clear language in domestic or international laws
that prohibits them.23 This hesitation is nowhere more evident than in
matters involving the state's international relations. Courts in all ju
risdictions have developed an array of doctrines - such as the politi
cal question doctrine, justiciability, and act of state - to muffle their
role as effective keepers of the rule of law in the international arena.24
This strong judicial deference hints at the strategy small groups
have developed to shield themselves against the vagaries of
democratic vote.
Whereas no constitution is beyond legislative
interpretation and, ultimately, popular amendment to the detriment of
small groups,25 international law and the court's deference in the
international arena facilitate the exit option, and hence offer the
ultimate protection of their interests.26 When larger groups have
managed to mobilize and impose restrictions on producers and
employers, such as antitrust regulations and higher labor standards,
the latter have reacted by shifting their activities to foreign markets
and societies.27 When domestic groups attempted to regulate these
extraterritorial activities through so-called "long arm statutes,"
international law provided shelter.28 The next Section shows how the
laissez-faire nature of international law continues to enable smaller
groups to evade national regulations and exploit global commons. In
fact, these smaller groups have had an even greater influence on the
development of international than on domestic law, primarily because
information-gathering and assessment costs are much higher in the
international arena. Since ancient times, international negotiations
have always enjoyed relative secrecy reinforced by public and judicial
approval of a Machiavellian-Darwinian view of sovereign states
struggling for survival in an anarchic and intimidating global
environment. Shielded from public scrutiny, small groups (producers,
importers, etc.) exercise great influence on the governments' conduct
23. Cf ROGER R. COTIERRELL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 248-49 {1984) ("Judges,
however, as state functionaries, cannot neglect considerations of state interests and these
may, on occasions, demand that doctrinal niceties be given short shrift in order to meet par
ticular governmental emergencies.").

24. See infra Sections Ill.A & III.C and text accompanying notes 88-96, 111-125.
25. Thus, Landes and Posner's suggestion that constitutional guarantees were the tools
to secure the interests of the smaller interest groups, notably their property rights, presented
only part of the institutional guarantees of small group interests - arguably the less signifi
cant part. See supra note 16.
26. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOI CE AND LOYALTY (1970); cf. Richard A.
Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB S. 147 {1992) {discussing
exit as a check on states' power in a federal system).
27. See John O. McGinnis, The Decline of the Western Nation State and the Rise of the
Regime of International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 903, 910-11 {1996) {noting that
the transformation of the Western nation state into a welfare state accelerated its decline).
28. International law did so through the creation of international organizations (IOs),
which are immune to national regulation. See infra text accompanying notes 46-50.
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of external affairs. The edge small groups enjoy can be traced by
following the development of international norms. The following
section examines the actual influence these groups have had in the
formulation of policies in several areas of law.
B.

The Transnational Conflict Paradigm in Practice

1.

Early Cases

Smaller groups have been successful in influencing international
negotiations and international law since the very inception of the
Westphalian order of sovereign states. In fact, a small but effective
group of Dutch merchants who sought to secure access to the high
seas were responsible for the birth of modern international law. In
1604, these merchants (who formed the Dutch United East India
Company) commissioned a legal brief from a young lawyer," Hugo
Grotius - now widely regarded as the founder of international law.29
His opinion, Mare liberum (published as a book in 1609),30 a brilliant
defense of the notion of the high seas as a shared resource, trans
formed the course of development of international law.31
The early seventeenth century witnessed several commercial dis
putes among merchants from different European countries. Grotius's
treatise related to a conflict between Portuguese and Dutch merchants
over the right to navigate the high seas leading to the coveted spice
markets of the Far East.32 At the same time, Dutch fishing fleets ar29. On the Grotian legacy in international Jaw, see David Kennedy, Primitive Legal
Scholarship, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 76-95 (1986); Hersch Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition
in International Law, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1946). But see the fierce critique in Giorgio
del Vecchio, Grotius and the Foundation of International Law, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 260
(1962).
30. The Dutch company ordered publication of an anonymous version in connection
with negotiations between the Netherlands and Spain, and possibly for reasons related to
domestic political conflict in the Netherlands. See C.G. Roelofsen, Grotius and the Interna
tional Politics of the Seventeenth Century, in HUGO GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 95, 109 (Hedley Bull et al. eds., 1990). For the background of the treatise, see
C.G. Roelofsen, Grotius and International Law: An Introduction to Some Themes in the
Field of Grotian Studies, in GROTIUS READER 3, 9-10 (L.E. van Holk & C.G. Roelofsen
eds., 1983) [hereinafter Roelofsen, Themes]. See also HAMILTON VREELAND, HUGO
GROTIUS - THE FATHER OF THE MODERN SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 45-47
(1917); J.K. 0UDENDIJK, STATUS AND EXTENT OF ADJACENT WATERS 15-16 (1970).
31. Grotius envisioned a world order based on sovereign states subject to nothing but
their free \viii. State consent, rather than God's commands or Papal grants, was therefore
the basis of international obligations. Accordingly, Grotius's reasoning refrained from al
luding to religious text and instead emphasized utilitarian arguments, such as economic effi
ciency: "[W]hen it can be done without any prejudice to his own interests, will not one per
son share with another things which are useful to the recipient, and no Joss to the giver?"
HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 38 (Ralph van Deman Magoffin trans., James
Brown Scott ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1916) (1633).
32. See VREELAND, supra note 30, at 51-52.
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gued with their English competitors over the right to fish in the waters
of the North Sea, or what King James I called the "British Seas."33
When English merchants grew interested in tapping the profitable Far
East markets, only to be rebuffed by Dutch competitors who had
managed to secure exclusive contracts with the foreign rulers, inter
governmental talks began in London.34 The merchants arguably could
have resolved these commercial disputes themselves through transna- tional negotiations and contracts rather than interstate agreements.35
But some influential competitors preferred to alter the game by mobi
lizing the support of their state and the strength of its army in their ef
forts to eliminate competition and ensure private capture. In other
words, these merchants sought to externalize the costs of creating a
trade monopoly on the state apparatus, whose military resources were
enlisted to secure the desired goal.36 This was a cozy deal for the rul
ing elites: in addition to added prestige, these dignitaries could benefit
from their merchants' increased revenues.
In their attempts to elevate commercial disputes to the interna
tional level, merchants contracted lawyers who offered different vi
sions of international law. Grotius's Mare liberum, with its open
access thesis that benefited Dutch merchants seeking access to ports in
Southeast Asia, was soon challenged by other founding fathers of in
ternational law. John Selden's treatise Mare clausum highlighted the
interests of British merchants who could rely on Britain's military su
periority.37 Commissioned to provide the antithesis to Grotius's work,

33. See OUDENDIJK, supra note 30, at 33-40; Roelofsen, Themes, supra note 30, at 13-14.
34. See OUDENDIJK, supra note 30, at 37-40.
35. In those days, merchants across political boundaries had been using a shared law,
called lex mercatoria or Law Merchant. This law was a cosmopolitan law, beyond states'
control. Its development through fairs, its reliance on customs, and its avoidance of formali
ties reflected a reliance on reputational sanctions and hence close ties between merchants.
The Dutch East India and the British East India companies could have resorted to this law
for resolving their emerging differences. For a discussion of the Law Merchant, see Clive
M. Schmitthoff, International Business Law: A New Law Merchant, in CLIVE M.
SCHMITIHOFF'S SELECT EsSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 20, 22-25 (Chia-Jui
Cheng ed., 1988) and Daniel R. Coquillette, Legal Ideology and Incorporation II: Sir Tho
mas Ridley, Charles Molloy, and the Literary Battle for the Law Merchant, 1607-1676, 61
B.U. L. REv. 315, 346-63 (1981). For a discussion of the Law Merchant's underlying logic,
see Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996) and Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out
Of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 115 (1992).
36. Similar efforts of local merchants to tap the legislative resources of the state to
change the rules of the game and drive out foreign competitors can also explain the demise
of Law Merchant in England. See 4 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
332-36 (3d ed. 1945) (describing how, in the latter part of the sixteenth century, English
trading companies began to drive out foreign merchants, sharing with Queen Elizabeth their
proceeds in return for public regulation of exports and imports); see also Coquillette, supra
note 35, at 362 & n.271.
37. JmIN SELDEN, MARE CLAUSUM, (Marchamont Nedham trans., London, William
Du-Gard 1652) (1635)).
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the book pleased King Charles so much that he ordered it to be placed
among the public records of the courts.38 Alberico Gentili, an Italian
born Oxford professor, who represented Spanish interests in the Eng
lish Court of Admiralty, took a middle course that reflected his clients'
objectives.39 Thus, interest groups formed general arguments to ad
vance their sectarian interests. International law quickly became a
tool for externalizing small-group costs upon the larger segments of
society.
2.

Contemporary Conflicts

The
quickly
learned
states.

early seventeenth-century commercial disputes show how
the dominant domestic interest groups adjusted to, and
to exploit, the emerging Westphalian order of sovereign
For this purpose, they used their strong influence on their
states' external relations not only to shape the outcomes of specific
treaty negotiations; but more generally, they influenced the develop

ment of both domestic and international law to create and maintain a
laissez-faire international legal environment. Such an environment fa
cilitates competition among states which small groups, whose reloca
tion costs are relatively low, continue to exploit.40
At the end of the twentieth century, international law still provides
small groups the same exit options that existed in earlier times. De
spite the growing effectiveness of labor conditions and human rights
norms, producers can still shop for jurisdictions that provide them with
virtually unprotected workforces. Even though early awareness of the
need to cooperate in promoting labor standards led to the establish
ment of the International Labour Organisation in 1919, no machinery
yet exists to monitor countries and effectively ensure compliance.41
Developments in human rights law have emphasized civil and political
rights rather than economic and social rights, thereby constraining

38. See Marchamont Nedham, Foreword to SELDEN, supra note 37, at 5; Eric G.M.
Fletcher, John Selden (Author of Mare clausum) and His Contribution to International Law,
19 'TRANSACTION OF THE GROTIUS SOCIETY 1, 8-9 {1934).
39. See GEZINA HJ. vAN DER MOLEN, ALBERICO GENTILI AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 165-67 {1937).
40. The colonies, and later the developing states, were the prime casualties of that atti
tude.
41. The idea of international action in promoting labor standards was raised by the
British industrialist Robert Owen in the Holy Alliance Congress in 1818. For discussion of
labor rights as human rights and the machinery for their protection, see generally HECTOR
BARTOLOMEI DE LA CRUZ ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION {1996);
HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL 'TRADE {Lance A. Compa & Ste
phen F. Diamond eds., 1996); Laura Ho et al., (Dis)assembling Rights of Women Workers
Along the Global Assembly Line: Human Rights and the Garment Industry, 31 HARV. C.R.
C.L. L. REV. 383 {1996); Klaus Samson, The Standard-Setting and Supervisory System of the
International Labour Organisation, in AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 149 {Raija Hanski & Markku Suksi eds., 1997).
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governments while leaving multinational employers relatively un
scathed.42
The other exit option - transactions through state-brokered
agreements subject to international law - provides small domestic
groups with significant benefits. While private law contracts are often
costly to negotiate and enforce because of monitoring and compliance
problems, reliance on the state machinery for negotiation and moni
toring may lower transaction costs, or at least externalize them.
Moreover, domestic norms that regulate private law contracts, such as
antitrust or consumer-protection regulations, impose significant limita
tions on certain transactions and hence increase transaction costs dra
matically. By signing international treaties, governments can enable
producers and other small interests to avoid these cumbersome limita
tions by shifting certain transactions onto the international plane.43 In
ternational law, which governs these treaties, remains virtually oblivi
ous to the adverse effects treaties might have on the interests of
nonstate third parties, such as consumers and workers.44 Under the
influence of the Westphalian paradigm, there has been little effort to
adjust the normative framework of international treaty law, which still
reflects early nineteenth-century laissez-faire values.45
Governments provide small interest groups the greatest level of
protection, however, through the establishment of international or
ganizations (!Os) as the locus of particular economic activities.46 !Os
have an independent legal personality under international law.47 They
enjoy immunity from suits in national courts and are not subject to any

42. See Ho et al., supra note 41, for a critical analysis of the employers' impunity under
international law.
43. Governments accomplish this shift through the establishment of IOs. For a more
thorough treatment of the role of IOs, see infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text. For a
specific discussion of the International Coffee Organization, see infra notes 63·65 and ac
companying text.
44. Treaties are subject only to an elusive concept ofjus cogens, which renders void only
those commitments that constitute grave breaches of international human rights law such as
slavery, genocide, etc. See THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS
AS CUSTOMARY LAW 31, 220-21 (1989); Michael Byers, Conceptualising the Relationship be
tween Jus Cogens and Erga Ornnes Rules, 66 NORDICJ. INT'LL. 211, 219 (1997).

45. The law governing treaties is embodied in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969, S. TREATY Doc. No. 92-1 (1969), 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna
Convention]. Aside from its vague reference tojus cogens, only state interests (for example,
the coercion of a state by a threat of war) can render a treaty invalid. See id. arts. 46-53.
46. An international organization is defined as an organization created by two or more
states, usually by a treaty; which has one or more organs that do not depend on the will of
one state only; and which is subject to international, rather than to a particular national, law.
See HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW
§§ 29-45 (3d rev. ed. 1995).
47. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United States (Advisory
Opinion), 1949 I.CJ. 173, 178-79 (April 11); PETER H.F. BEKKER, THE LEGAL POSITION OF
INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 54-61 (1994); SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra
note 46, at§§ 1562-1574.
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national rules prohibiting antitrust or protecting creditors against in
solvency.48 More importantly (from the participating states' perspec
tive), international law works together with national statutes and judi
cial doctrine to further secure state interests at the expense of
individuals who interact with !Os. These norms shield state parties to
such organizations from direct or vicarious liability for acts of the insti
tutions.49 Thus, it remains questionable whether such organizations
are subject to the same duties states owe for the protection of human
rights.50 In short, international law, through its laissez-faire approach
to treaties and !Os, continues to provide a convenient legal environ
ment to domestic small interest groups seeking to pursue transnational

48. In the wake of the collapse of the London-based International Tin Council, claims of
individual debtors were rejected owing to the immunity enjoyed by the organization. See
J.H. Rayner Ltd. v. Dep't of Trade & Indus., [1989] 3 W.L.R. 969, 81 l.L.R. 670 (H.L.)
[hereinafter The ITC Litigation]; see also International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649
F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981) (dismissing a suit by a U.S. labor union against OPEC and the indi
vidual member states of OPEC under the Sherman Act on procedural grounds). For more
in-depth discussion of this issue, see generally BEKKER, supra note 47; Michael Singer, Ju

risdictional Immunity of International Organizations: Human Rights and Functional Neces
sity Concerns, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 53 (1996); and Romana Sadurska & C.M. Chinkin, The
Collapse of the International Tin Council: A Case of State Responsibility?, 30 VA. J. INT'L L.
845 (1990).
49. See The ITC Litigation, supra note 48, 3 W.L.R. at 980, 81 1.L.R. at 671; see also
Arab Org. for Industrialization v. Westland Helicopters Ltd., 80 l.L.R. 622 (Fed. Sup. Ct.
1989) (Switzerland) (finding the insolvent AOI legally distinct from the state parties and
hence finding the latter not liable for the AOI obligations); C.F. Amerasinghe, Liability to

Third Parties of Member States of International Organizations: Practice, Principle and Judi
cial Precedent, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 259 (1991) (suggesting that under international law, it is up
to the state parties to the international organization to determine whether or not they would
be responsible for its debts, and their choice should be reflected in the IO's constitutive
documents). See generally MOSHE HIRSCH, THE REsPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS TOWARD THIRD PARTIES (1995). Until recently, the International Law
Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility contributed to the presumed lack of
responsibility. Draft Article 13 suggested that:
The conduct of an organ of an international organization acting in that capacity shall not be
considered as an act of a State under international law by reason only of the fact that such
conduct has taken place in the territory of that State or in any other territory under its juris
diction.
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on State Responsibility, reprinted in 37 l.L.M.
440, 445 (1998). In its 1998 decision, the ILC decided to replace Article 13 and all other ref
erences to !Os with a saving clause, which removed the entire question of state responsibility
to !Os from the scope of the Draft Articles. Draft Article A now reads: "These draft articles
shall not prejudice any question that may arise in regard to the responsibility under interna
tional law of an international organization or of any State for the conduct of an international
organization." See Bruno Simma, The Work of the International Law Commission at Its Fif
tieth Session (1998), 67 NORDICJ. INT'LLAW 431, 456 (1998).
50. The E.U. is a prime example of an IO that has consistently refused to view itself as
bound by external human rights norms, developing instead, somewhat begrudgingly, its own
standards. See EUROPEAN UNION: THE HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGE (Antonio Cassese et
al. eds., 1991); EUROPEAN UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Nanette A. Neuwahl & Allan Ro
sas eds., 1995); Philip Alston & Joseph H.H. Weiler, An 'Ever Closer Union' in Need of a
Human Rights Policy: The European Union and Human Rights (Jean Monnet Working Pa
per No. 1/99, Harvard Law School),
available at <http://www.law.harvard.edu/Prog
rams/JeanMonnet/papers/papers99.html>.
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commercial transactions sheltered from the ever-growing national
regulation.
The domestic bureaucracy and political leadership are the firms'
willing partners. Similar to their seventeenth-century predecessors,
they eagerly engage in such transactions. Together with the emerging
transnational bureaucracy, they profit from greater discretion in the
reallocation of the surplus resources such agreements generate, in ad
dition to the status and perks these missions provide.51 The public re
mains largely unaware of the implications of such transactions; thus,
politicians find it politically advantageous to tolerate them.
Domestic influences are particularly noticeable in environmental
disputes.
From the first international litigation related to trans
boundary environmental damage - sulfur dioxide emissions from a
Canadian smelting company at Trail in British Columbia52 - to cur
rent debates over prevention of global warming and the protection of
the ozone layer, sectarian domestic interests hold sway in international
negotiations and influence the development (or lack thereof) of inter
national law. Thus, for example, the governments of the upper
riparian states tolerated the continuous pollution of the Rhine River
throughout the 1970s and 1980s out of deference to those industries
that treated the river as their private backyard dumping area.53 These
governments, yielding to the interests of the domestic industries and
their workforce, colluded to stall effective plans to reclaim and protect
the river by their sustained support for a largely ineffective interna
tional protection system.54 Similarly, Finland and Sweden, whose co51. See Frey, supra note 22, at 106-23.
52. The Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 RI.A.A. 1905 (1938).
53. See Aaron Schwabach, Comment, The Sandoz Spill: The Failure of International
Law to Protect the Rhine from Pollution, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443 (1989) (discussing the disas
trous consequences of the 1986 toxic waste contamination of the Rhine from a warehouse in
Basel and examining the failure of the Rhine treaty regime). For background on the litiga
tion in Dutch courts with respect to pollution of the Rhine by a French mining company in
Alsace, see Handelskwekerij GJ. Bier B.V. and Stichting "Reinwater" v. Mines de Potasse
d'Alsace S.A. (MDPA), 11 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 326 (1980); for subsequent litigation in this
dispute, see Handelskwekerij G.J. Bier B.V. and Stichting "Reinwater" v. Mines de Potasse
d'Alsace S.A. (MDPA), 15 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 471 (1984), and Mines de Potasse d'Alsace
S.A. (MDPA)/Onroerend Goed Maatschappij, 19 NETH. Y.B. INT'LL. 496 (1988) [hereinaf
ter MDPA I!IJ. For similar litigation in the French courts, see La Province de la Hollande
septentrionale contre Etat ministre de !'Environnement, Tribunal Administratife de Stras
bourg, 27 July 1983, reprinted in 4 REVUE JURIDIQUE DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT 343 (1983)
(annulling the permit to pollute), overturned Conseil d'Etat, 18 April 1986, reprinted in 2-3
REVUE JURIDIQUE DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT 296 (1986) (finding no manifest error in granting
the permit) [hereinafter French Pollution Permit Case]. For a discussion of an "unsatisfac
tory" 1994 decision of another local court in the Netherlands concerning pollution by a Bel
gian company of the River Meuse, see Jan M. van Dunne, Liability in Tort for the Detri
mental Use of Fresh Water Resources Under Dutch Law in Domestic and International Cases,
in THE SCARCITY OF WATER 196, 205 (Edward H.P. Brans et al. eds., 1997). The fact that
these cases of pollution had to be brought to court, and by Dutch NGOs, suggests the politi
cal constraints involved.
54. The polluting industries along the Rhine, from Basel, Switzerland, to the heavily
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operation is usually cause for envy and emulation,55 failed to agree on
jointly reducing pollution from pulp mills due to the successful resis
tance to regulation initiatives mounted by their respective pulp indus
tries.56
Domestic interest groups also shaped the United States position in
international negotiations. U.S. leadership in global efforts to curb
production of CFC emissions to protect the ozone layer throughout
the 1980s and early 1990s was motivated primarily by the five Ameri
can CFC producers - producers responsible for thirty percent of the
world production, but whose CFC sales did not account for a signifi
cant part of their revenue. Once these firms developed substitutes for
most CFC uses, they stood to gain from a global CFC ban.57 In con
trast, the contemporaneous U.S. failure to join the Convention on
Biological Diversity was a function of the adverse economic conse
quences it entailed for private American companies.58 Negotiations
over a Biosafety Protocol under the Biological Diversity Convention
collapsed in February 1999.59 The protocol, which would have re
stricted trade in genetically modified agricultural products, was
blocked by a coalition of six states whose industries had strong inter
ests in such trade.60
Domestic interest groups shape international trade law and nego
tiations. They have driven governments into both trade wars and vioindustrialized Ruhr in Germany, opposed stringent controls that would increase production
costs. Their workers shared this interest, fearing for their jobs. These groups shaped their
governments' positions in negotiating the Rhine treaty regime. See Schwabach, supra note
53, at 469-70. Following the 1986 major spill of toxic chemicals into the Rhine from the San
doz warehouse in Basel, the West German opposition party, the Social Democrats, justified
its decision to remain silent by the fear of industry relocation: "We can't pull out of the in
dustrial society . . . . We don't want to." Russel Watson et al., The Blot on the Rhine,
NEWSWEEK, Nov. 24, 1986, at 58 (quoting Harold Schaefer, spokesperson of the Social
Democrats). In 1986, the Dutch court of appeal determined that the level of salt allowed by
the 1976 Bonn Salt Convention was exceedingly high, damaging the river and the environ
ment in the Netherlands, and constituting a breach of Dutch tort law. See MDPA III, supra
note 53.

55. See infra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing the Swedish-Finnish Frontiers
River Commission).
56. See Matthew R. Auer, Geography, Domestic Politics and Environmental Diplomacy:
A Case from the Baltic Sea Region, 11 GEO. INT'L . ENVTL. L. REV. 77 (1998).
57. See TODD SANDLER, GLOBAL CHALLENGES 112-13 (1997); see also RICHARD
ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY (1998).
58. See Kai Raustiala, The Domestic Politics of Global Biodiversity Protection in the
United Kingdom and the United States, in THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 42, 48-52 (Elizabeth Economy & Miranda A. Schreurs eds.,
1997).
59. See Christopher S. Zalewski & Paul F. McQuade, A Stalemate on Biosafety Pact,
THE NAT'L L.J., May 24, 1999, at Cl; U.S. and Allies Block Treaty on Gene-Altered Goods,
N.Y. TIMES , February 25, 1999, at Al [hereinafter U.S. and Allies].
60. These states included the United States, Canada, Australia, Argentina, Chile, and
Uruguay - all of them major agricultural exporters. See Zalewski & McQuade, supra note
59; U.S. and Allies, supra note 59.
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lations of trade agreements.61 Trade agreements, informal under
standings, and even elaborate institutional regimes help producers
from different countries establish and maintain cartels to the detri
ment of consumers.62 Other treaties reflect complex give and take be
tween producers and bureaucrats. Robert Bates' recent study of the
International Coffee Organization (ICO) is an in-depth exploration of
a contemporary example of an international market failure that the
prevailing Westphalian paradigm is incapable of addressing.63 The
ICO was a cartel of coffee-producing states, controlled by the two
leading producers, Brazil and Colombia. During the almost three
decades of its operation, from the early 1960s to late 1989, the ICO set
quotas for participating states, thereby restraining competition and
raising the price of coffee. The United States supported the ICO. In
fact, the support of the United States, responsible for over fifty per
cent of the world's imports of coffee, was integral to the ICO's en
forcement because the monitoring and policing of quotas was left to
the consuming states' customs offices. In other words, for almost
three decades the U.S. government spent public resources to police a
scheme that actually imposed a significant but hidden tax on Ameri
can coffee consumers and encroached on certain U.S. businesses. Po
litical rather than economic reasons motivated this behavior, and these
actions cannot be understood without piercing the veil of national
sovereignty. The U.S. position was the result of a comfortable deal
among a small domestic interest group (the large coffee roasting
firms), legislators, and bureaucrats. The higher price for raw materials
gave the larger roasters an economic advantage over the smaller ones.
In exchange for long-term contracts with deferred rebates, these large
61. Ongoing trade disputes between the United States and the European Union over
E.U. restrictions on the importation of genetically modified food, hormone-treated beef, and
bananas from Central America, as well as U.S. retaliatory measures in the form of 100%
tariffs on certain E.U. exports to the U.S., reflect competition, rather than collusion, among
rival domestic interests. But they also reflect the direct influence these domestic groups
have on their respective governments' positions. This influence has prompted the E.U. to
disregard the rulings of the World Trade Organization, which had found the E.U. in breach
of trade agreements in both the banana and beef hormone disputes. See The \VfO Appel
late Body Reports: European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distri
bution of Bananas, Rep. No. \Vf/DS27/AB/R, 9 September, 1997; EC Measures concerning
Meat and Meat Products (Hormone), Rep. No. WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, 16 Janu
ary 1998) [hereinafter WTO Appellate Reports]. These violations persisted despite the find
ings and the U.S. retaliatory measures. See U.S. - Europe Trade War Looms over Bananas,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1998, at Al; Imports Face Higher Tariffs on Beef Issue, N.Y. TIMES,
March 23, 1999, at Cl.
62. During the 1980s, protective U.S. trade policies restricted, among others, the import
of Japanese cars, of textile and apparel, of steel, and of semiconductors. These policies
benefited some U.S. as well as foreign industries, while American consumers bore the costs.
See William A. Niskanen, US Trade Policy, in 3 REGULATION 34 (1988), reprinted in
WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, POLICY ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC CHOICE 183 (1998). For an analy
sis of the International Coffee Organization, see ROBERT H. BATES, OPEN-ECONOMY
PoLmcs (1997); infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text
63. See BATES, supra note 62.
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roasters lobbied and testified in Congress for its endorsement of the
!CO regime.64 A complacent Congress benefited the executive bu
reaucracy, whose dominant goal was to prevent domestic challenges to
the U.S.-backed Latin American regimes, a threat they called "Cas
troism."65 The ICO deal provided an opportunity to shift unnoticed
funds from the U.S. economy to Latin America, making some influen
tial producers happy.
A final example in support of the transnational conflict paradigm is
the treatment of global tax competition by the Organization for Eco
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In view of "the dis
torting effects of harmful tax competition," the OECD created a
committee in 1996 to report on the situation and recommend possible
measures to address it.66 Two years later, the OECD Council ap
proved the committee's report and adopted its modest and controver
sial recommendations.67 The report makes clear that pervasive tax
competition is not only economically inefficient, but also inequitable
as it shifts the tax burden from mobile capital to less mobile labor that is, from the smaller groups to the larger ones.68 The report spe
cifically identifies domestic business interests as responsible for the
ever-expanding competition. The committee, in a rather diplomatic
tone, hints at the political complexity of the issue: from 1985 to 1994,
foreign direct investment from G7 countries in low tax jurisdictions
increased more than five-fold, well above the growth rate of total out
bound foreign direct investments.69 In other words, although the
heads of the G7 claim to be troubled by what they see as "harmful tax
competition . . . carrying risks of distorting trade and investment [that]
could lead to the erosion of national tax bases,"70 they have not com
mitted to taking effective action that would adversely affect their re
spective domestic actors.71 With Luxembourg and Switzerland critical

64. For the role of the large roasters, see id. at 129-33, 150-53.
65. For the motivations of the administration, see id. at 121-29. Although one could say
that the U.S. executive pursued here a general anti-Soviet interest, this interest was not sub
ject to scrutiny by Congress.
66. See ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV.,
COMPETITION para. 1, at 7 (1998) [hereinafter OECD].

liARMFuL TAX

67. Luxembourg and Switzerland criticized the recommendations and abstained. See id.
at 73-78. For criticism, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition and the
Fiscal Crisis of the State (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
68. See OECD, supra note 66, para. 30, at 16. "The Committee is aware that many of
the preferential tax regimes referred to in this Report have been put in place in response to
pressures by the business community on those parts of government that have the responsi
bility for economic development." Id. para. 32, at 17.
69. See id. para. 35, at 17.
70. Id. para. 1, at 7 (quoting Communique of the G7 Heads of State in the Lyon Sum
mit, 1996).
71. For criticism of the recommendations' effectiveness, see Avi-Yonah, supra note 67.
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about the "partial and unbalanced approach" of the report and rec
ommendations, it remains to be seen whether the rest of the OECD
countries will implement the recommendations.72

III. THE TRANSNATIONAL CONFLICT PARADIGM AND THE LAW:
SUSTAINING NORMS, PROCEDURES, AND INSTITUTIONS
Smaller domestic interest groups have not only used their relative
edge over other domestic groups to secure specific gains and a com
fortable international legal environment; they have also invested in es
tablishing a legal framework to ensure their continuing control over
international negotiations and secure the durability of negotiated trea
ties while allowing low-cost, momentary evasions of treaty obligations.
This Part will delineate the relevant norms, procedures, and institu
tions that make up this framework.
A.

Treaty Negotiation and Ratification

Smaller domestic interest groups enjoy a great deal of control over
the treaty negotiation process and outcome, and therefore risk little in
shifting these transactions from the private to the international sphere.
As suggested by Robert Putnam, the structure of international nego
tiations is a two-level game simultaneously played by government rep
resentatives at the international level with the representatives of the
foreign governments and at the domestic level with representatives of
domestic interest groups.73 The smaller domestic interest groups, be
cause of their particularly strong influence in the negotiation and rati
fication processes, are poised to dominate the game at the domestic
level. They will capture the executive, or instead stall, water down, or
block negotiations that could encroach on their interests.74 The do
mestic level of the game is composed of two phases: the negotiation
phase, followed by the ratification phase. The smaller interest groups
have particularly strong influence during the negotiation phase. At
that opaque stage, smaller groups are better positioned than other
groups to act collectively in monitoring the government's representa-

72. See OECD, supra note 66, at 73 (reporting statement by Lu.xembourg); id. at 76 (re
porting statement by Switzerland).
73. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level
Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427, 436 {1988). On this two-level game, see generally DOUBLE
EDGED DIPLOMACY (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1993) (analyzing eleven cases of two-level
bargaining); GEORGE w. DOWNS & DAVID M. ROCKE, OP'TIMAL IMPERFECTION? (1995);
MILNER, INTERESTS supra note 14. For an argument for a "three-level game" - including
an additional "transnational/transgovemmental bargaining" level, see Thomas Risse
Kappen, Structures of Governance and Transnational Relations: What We Have Learned?, in
BRINGING TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS BACK IN 280, 300 (Thomas Risse-Kappen ed.,
1995).
74. See MILNER, INTERESTS supra note 14, ch. 3.
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tives and furnishing them with partial data.75 Should they fail to per
suade the executive, they can revert to the second line of defense the ratification phase. International agreements usually require na
tional ratification in one form or another,76 and different ratification
forms have bearing on negotiators' available options.77 Because of the
advantage smaller groups have during the negotiation stage, however,
the often times more transparent and accessible ratification process is
more likely to serve as a check on their gains at the first phase rather
than as a shield; but the check is not very effective. During the ratifi
cation phase, smaller groups still enjoy a relative edge over larger
groups because they can take advantage of the information collected
during the negotiation phase, over which they have a virtual monop
oly.
The particular vulnerability of the process of treaty negotiation
and ratification to interest group influence is made clearer when com
pared to garden-variety, domestic legislation. In contrast to the rela
tively transparent and accessible legislative process, international ne
gotiations are less susceptible to serious domestic scrutiny and
effective democratic deliberation. Moreover, unlike legislative pro
posals, which the legislature controls from the initial introduction of
bills through the discussion of amendments to the final product, the
treaty to be ratified is a completed transaction essentially immune
from subsequent unilateral alterations.78 The sequential process of
treaty ratification allows the government a free hand in setting the
agenda, formulating the policies, and choosing among alternatives.79
75. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Misguided Debate over NGO Participation at the WTO, 1
J. INT'L ECON. L. 433, 446-47 (1998) (describing the information assistance Kodak and Fuji
provided to their governments in their trade dispute).

76. This is true not only in democratic countries in which treaties must be approved by
domestic ratification procedure. Nondemocratic regimes must also secure informal ratifica
tion by the elites from which they draw support. See Peter B. Evans, Building an Integrative
Approach to International and Domestic Politics, in DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY, supra
note 73, at 397, 415-16 (comparing domestic influence on international positions in demo
cratic and nondemocratic regimes); cf. Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, Democratic States and Commit
ment in International Relations, 50 INT'L ORO. 108 (1996) (arguing that democracies can better
maintain international commitments than nondemocracies can.).
77. Thus, the different ratification procedures in the United States and Britain, and the
different legal status of treaties within the respective domestic legal systems can explain their
different attitudes toward the adoption of international environmental standards. Cf.
Raustiala, supra note 58 (comparing the two countries' attitudes in negotiating international
biodiversity standards).
78. For an analysis of the political advantages presidents have over the legislature
through the exclusive power to initiate, to make take-it-or-leave-it proposals, and to control
information, see MATIHEW s. SHUGART & JOHN M. CAREY, PRESIDENTS AND
ASSEMBLIES 139-40 (1992).
79. There are profound advantages to the party who can decide how to sequence the
voting process when there are more than two options open to the voters (and when there are
more than two voters). As was formally demonstrated in KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALVES (1951), the agenda-setter can virtually dictate the final
vote simply by deciding the order of votes.
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The ex post "take it or leave it" option presented to the ratifying body
erects a high hurdle for those who wish to oppose or amend the inter
national transaction.80
In many states the ratification process does not require legislative
approval and hence permits even fewer opportunities to scrutinize the
treaty.81 In Scandinavia, and in those states following the British tradi
tion, the government, rather than the legislature, ratifies the treaty and
thereby commits the state to international obligations.82 In theory,
such ratification does not carry any domestic implications, because
ratification cannot change national law. But in fact, unless there is a
statute that specifically conflicts with the treaty obligations, the gov
ernment is not deterred from implementing these obligations domesti
cally through regulations or other acts. Under the Charming Betsy
doctrine,83 the onus is on the legislature to pass a statute that would
explicitly invalidate the treaty's internal effect. The legislature may
hesitate to do so, because such enactment could amount to a breach of
the state's international obligations.
In the United States, the interplay between Congress and the Ex
ecutive in the treaty ratification process is more complicated. On the
one hand, the constitutional requirement of a two-thirds majority in
the Senate for "advice and consent" to treaties endows a minority of
34 senators with veto power,84 thereby enabling interest groups to con
centrate their efforts on fewer legislators.85 Executive agreements

80. Reservations, understandings, and declarations and interpretations, attached to trea
ties at the time of ratification or made thereafter, could alter somewhat the contours of the
agreement without breaching it. Note, however, that such pronouncements may be limited
by the treaty or by general international law, which proscribes reservations that are "incom
patible with the object and purpose of the treaty." Vienna Convention, supra note 45, art.
19(c).
81. See Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, Foreword: Symposium on Parlia
mentary Participation in the Making and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 293,
303 (1991). For a comparative survey of the practices of treaty ratification, see THE EFFECT
OF TREATIES IN DOMESTIC LAW (Francis G. Jacobs & Shelley Roberts eds., 1987) [hereinaf
ter EFFECT OF 'TREATIES]; Symposium on Parliamentary Participation in the Making and
Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 293 (1991).
82. For the British procedure, see R. Higgins, United Kingdom, in EFFECT OF
'TREATIES, supra note 81, at 123-24, and Lord Templeman, Treaty-Making and the British
Parliament, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 459 (1991). For the situation in Denmark, see Claus
Gulmann, Denmark, in EFFECT OF 'TREATIES, supra note 81, at 29-30; in Iceland, see Ragnar
Adalsteinsson, The Current Situation of Human Right in Iceland, 61162 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 167,
168-70 (1992-93); in Sweden, see Michael Bogdan, Application of Public International Law by
Swedish Courts, 63 NORDICJ. INT'LL. 3, 8-11 (1994).
83. See Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). On this widely ac
cepted doctrine and its implications, see infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
84. See Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate Control
over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 601 (1991).
85. The involvement of Congress does not necessarily result in the representation of the
larger constituency. Indeed, sometimes Congress is captured by small interests, while at the
same time the Executive promotes general interests.
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compromise this strategy, however, by allowing a presidential bypass
of the Senate in the conclusion of international obligations.86 Small
groups need therefore invest in influencing the executive. In recent
years, the United States has developed a so-called "fast track" proce
dure with respect to trade agreements in which the President agrees to
involve Congress in the negotiation phase in return for a bicameral
congressional commitment to vote the agreement up or down without
amendment.87 Congress's involvement at the negotiation phase limits
the discretion of government negotiators at the international bargain
ing process and provides more voice to groups that are less influential
\vith the Executive, although the President continues to control the
agenda.
Domestic courts have embraced the pervasive lack of significant
legislative supervision of international negotiations. In the celebrated
case of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the United States
Supreme Court affirmed that

[i]n this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and
manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen
as a representative of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and
consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotia
tion the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade
it.88
The logic of this argument holds as long as the distinction between
domestic and international affairs remains sharp. But when interna86. Executive agreements take one of two forms: unilateral acts by the President, and
executive actions requiring approval by a bicameral majority of Congress rather than a su
permajority of the Senate. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Behnont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); REsTA1EMENT

(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES §303 & cmt. g (1986)
[hereinafter REsTA1EMENT] ("Presidents have asserted a broad authority to make many other
international agreements [in addition to recognition of states and armistice agreements], at least
in the absence of inconsistent legislation or of Congressional action restricting such agree
ments."). On executive agreements, see generally LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
UNITED STATES CoNSTITUTION 215-30 (2d ed. 1996); John H. Jackson, United States, in EFFECT
OF TREATIES, supra note 81, at 141, 142-44; Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution· Execu
tive Expediency and Executive Agreements, 86 CAL. L. REV. 671 (1998); and Riesenfeld & Ab
bott, supra note 84, at 635-41.
87. See Harold H. Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 143 (1992); Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 84, at 637-38; Detlev F. Vagts, The Ex
clusive Treaty Power Revisited, 89 AM J. INT'L L. 40, 41-42 (1995). See generally George A.
Bermann, Constitutional Implications of U.S. Participation in Regional Integration, 46 AM J.
COMP. L. 463 (1998).
.

.

88. 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). The Court used Congress's relative lack of information as
an argument against its involvement in decisionmaking:
[The President], not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which
prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential
sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other offi
cials. Secrecy in respect of information gathered by them may be highly necessary, and the
premature disclosure of it productive of harmful results.
Id. at 320.
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tional negotiations impose significant burdens on domestic policies
and on individuals, executive power must be limited.
For the same reasons, courts have been reluctant to assert their
own powers to review ratified treaties. As a result, treaties enjoy
greater immunity from judicial review than statutes. In some coun
tries, the constitution accords treaties a higher status than statutes,
sometimes even higher than the constitution itself, thereby immuniz
ing treaties from judicial scrutiny.89 In those jurisdictions where treaty
ratification is deemed a governmental (formerly a royal) prerogative,
treaties are insulated from judicial review, somewhat paradoxically,
because they have no direct effect in the domestic legal system and
hence no effect on individual rights.90 In other states, national courts
are, in theory, competent to review the constitutionality of treaties (or
of statutes implementing treaties), but only the constitutional courts of
Italy, Germany, and the United States have asserted such authority,
and then only in rare and exceptional cases.91
The judicial hesitation to constitutionally scrutinize treaties fits
well with the general attitude of national courts to defer to the discre
tion of the executive in conducting the country's foreign affairs.92 Ju89. See, e.g., J.D. de la Rochere, France, in EFFECT OF TREATIES, supra note 81, at 42
(discussing article 55 of the French constitution); Henry G. Schermers, Netherlands, in
EFFECT OF TREATIES, supra note 81, at 109, 111 (discussing article 120 of the Dutch consti
tution).
90. This applies to Britain and other Commonwealth countries, as well as to the Scandi
navian countries. See Templeman, supra note 82, at 461; sources cited supra note 82.
91. The single U.S. case striking down a treaty {domestically classified as an executive
agreement) as incompatible with the Constitution remains Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 {1957).
Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 662, however, suggests that the Supreme Court is ready to relax
constitutional norms in deference to "the never-ending tension between the President exer
cising the executive authority in a world that presents each day some new challenge with
which he must deal and the Constitution under which we all live and which no one disputes
embodies some sort of system of checks and balances . . . ." See also Missouri v. Holland,
252 U.S. 416 {1920) (holding that Congress and the federal government had power to do by
treaty what they could not do by domestic legislation); LOUIS HENKIN,
CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 71 (1990) ("Where 'balancing'
an individual right against the public interest is deemed to be the constitutional order, courts
treat foreign affairs differently: private rights are depreciated, while competing public needs
are accorded compelling weight."). But see Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power a_nd Ameri
can Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390 (1998) (arguing for greater federalism constraints on
the treaty power). The German Constitutional Court "will spare no effort and, in fact, will
go out of its way, to reconcile Germany's treaty obligations with its internal legal order."
Jochen Abr. Frowein & Michael J. Hahn, The Participation of Parliament in the Treaty Proc
ess in the Federal Republic of Germany, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 361, 385 (1992). Thus, it has
found a treaty incompatible with the constitution only once. See id. at 384-85. The Italian
constitutional court "took the attitude of undervaluing conflicts between treaties and the
Constitution." Giorgio Gaja, Italy, in EFFECT OF TREATIES, supra note 81, at 87, 101. The
constitutional courts of Germany and Italy have also upheld their authority to review Par
liamentary decisions to transfer sovereign powers to the European Union (but never exer
cised it). See PAUL P. CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BORCA, EC LAW 262-63, 264-67 {1998). On
the German Constitutional Court's decision with respect to the constitutionality of the
Maastricht Treaty, see infra note 165 and accompanying text.
92. See Byal Benvenisti, Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of International
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dicial interference with treaty obligations is deemed an intervention in
international affairs, regardless of the domestic implications. The ba
sic attitude has been that in international affairs, "[o]ur State cannot
speak with two voices on such a matter, the judiciary saying one thing,
the executive another,"93 and the executive's voice is preferred because
of an inherent "advantage of the diplomatic approach to the resolu
tion of difficulties between two sovereign nations, as opposed to the
unilateral action by the courts of one nation."94 Hence, only the ex
ecutive's voice will be heard. Therefore, not only do courts abstain
from reviewing international treaties for compatibility with domestic
prescriptions, but when interpreting them they also defer to the execu
tive's interpretation.95 Furthermore, a variety of judicially developed
"avoidance doctrines" permit the courts to dodge petitions to review
treaties against domestic norms, or to review domestic policies against
international norms.96 Such extreme deference to the executive is
deeply troubling as it enables a sizable amount of executive activity,
having major ramifications on domestic interests, to remain com
pletely beyond judicial reach and effective public scrutiny. As the
next two sections will show, the same deferential attitude persists be
yond the ratification stage, when attempts are made to terminate uni
laterally a treaty or to renege temporarily on it. This ensures the ex
ecutive branch virtually unfettered discretion in deciding whether to
comply with treaty obligations.

B.

Ensuring Treaty Durability

Domestic and international norms that insulate treaty obligations
from postratification domestic challenges by larger political groups
further enhance the stronger domestic effect of treaties vis-a-vis statNorms: An Analysis of Attitudes of National Courts, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 159 (1993). This
comparative survey proves that the phenomenon is common to all national courts, and
therefore cannot be explained by parochial theories. But cf. Bruce Ackerman & David
Golove, Is NAFI'A Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995) (explaining judicial ac
ceptance of the constitutionality of "executive agreements" as reflecting a "constitutional
moment" that occurred during the 1944 elections); Paul, supra note 86 (explaining that and
other propresidential policies as influenced by the Cold War rhetoric used by the administra
tion).
93. The Arantzazu Mendi, 1939 App. Cas. 256, 264 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.)
(granting immunity to the nationalist government of Spain by the British House of Lords fol
lowing recognition by the Foreign Office as a de facto government).
94. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 669 n.16 (1992).
95.

See Benvenisti, supra note 92, at 166-68.

96. Id. at 169-73. These doctrines range from the more general ones, such as standing,
justiciability, and the political question doctrine, to specific doctrines that reduce the bite of
international norms (deference to the executive's interpretation of treaty provisions, failure
to recognize the standing of individuals to seek redress for the violation of international ob
ligations) and protect local and foreign governments from judicial proceedings (through sov
ereign immunity or "act-of-state" doctrines).
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utes. Once ratified, there is neither an opportunity to revoke a treaty
through judicial review, nor the possibility of terminating it through
unilateral state action by, for example, a statute. Unless the ratifying
state chooses to violate the treaty and suffer whatever consequences
breach entails, it remains bound until the other signatories agree to
modify or terminate it.97 Herein lies the domestic smaller groups'
chief benefit from treaties: the treaty provides their gains greater pro
tection than does a constitutional guarantee. Unlike constitutional
guarantees, which are vulnerable to modification through constitu
tional amendments, no subsequent domestic majority can unilaterally
change the state's international obligations. Future governments will
therefore continue to be bound by the same obligations.
A combination of constitutional and international doctrines grant
this immunity to international treaties. International law ensures
treaty durability by rendering irrelevant all subsequent domestic po
litical developments as factors that might affect a state's international
obligations.98 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) recently dem
onstrated the strength of this doctrine in its 1997 judgment concerning
a dispute between Hungary and Slovakia.99 The ICJ determined that
the damming of the Danube River, a mammoth project conceived in
the bygone communist era, should go ahead despite the momentous
political transformations that had taken place in the two states and the
intensive and widespread popular opposition to the project in Hun
gary. Neither domestic political changes nor strong popular opposi
tion to the project could excuse the unilateral termination of a 1977
treaty.100 The communist legacy, however inefficient or environmen
tally dangerous, survived the transformation of both regimes and all
unilateral contradictory moves of the two governments.101 Finding the
97.

See Vienna Convention, supra note 45, arts. 39-40.

98. See id. art. 27 ("A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justifica
tion for its failure to perform a treaty.").
99. Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagyrnaros Project {Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7
{Sept. 25).
100. For a discussion of the development of the internal environmental-political opposi
tion in Hungary to the planned project on the Danube River, see FRED PEARCE, GREEN
WARRIORS 107-16 {1991); Judit Galambos, Political Aspects of an Environmental Conflict: The
Case of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam System, in PERSPECI1VES ON ENVIRONMENTAL
CONFLICTAND INTERNATIONALPOUTICS 72 (Jyrki Kiikonen ed., 1992).
101. See Gabcikovo-Nagyrnaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at paras. 144-147, at 79-80. In
reaching this conclusion the court deliberately emphasized international undertakings at the ex
pense of domestic pressures. It rejected Hungary's claim that a "state of ecological necessity,"
even if such existed, precluded the wrongfulness of its unilateral suspension of the project, be
cause Hungary could resort to negotiations to reduce the environmental risks. It similarly re
jected Hungary's claims to impossibility of performance, fundamental change of circumstances,
and lawful response to Czechoslovakia's earlier material breach (namely, Slovakia's construction
of the provisional diversion project). See id. at paras. 101-112, at 63-68. The ICJ was also critical
of Slovakia's moves. It found the Slovak diversion of the Danube waters as breaching its obliga
tion to respect Hungary's right to an equitable and reasonable share of the river. See id. at para.
78, at 54.
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agreement flexible and therefore renegotiable, the ICJ imposed the 1977
treaty on both sides, prescribing them to renegotiate its implementa
tion.102 The judgment clearly seeks to insulate international politics from
the influence of domestic politics. Even when one side breaches its obli
gation to renegotiate in good faith, the government of the other side
cannot bow to domestic internal public pressure and adopt a unilateral
response. Instead, it must exhaust all possible means to persuade its
counterpart to return to the negotiating table.103
The international legal doctrine is buttressed in many countries by
constitutional or doctrinal guarantees that insulate treaties from ef
forts of domestic groups to force the government to breach treaty ob
ligations. Aside from the few states where treaty obligations enjoy su
perior status,104 statutes can theoretically supercede treaty obligations;
the legislature may pass a conflicting law and thereby expose the state
to external sanctions. A judicially created rule of statutory interpreta
tion accepted in many jurisdictions - that statutes should be inter
preted as much as possible in conformity with the state's international
obligations - often preempts these efforts, however.105 Although the
stated justification is the presumed intent of the legislature, courts
have resorted to the rule in spite of rather clear indications from the
legislature that it wanted the treaty breached. A case in point is the
"sad case of the P.L.O. mission," in which the judge disregarded Con
gress's clear intent to breach the Headquarters Agreement between
the U.S. and the U.N. by preventing the PLO leader from arriving in
New York.106 The court found the statute vague enough to permit an

102.

See id. at paras. 138-140, at 77-78.

103. Tiris is the cumulative message of the decision, which is captured in President Schwe
bel's declaration. Although he was "not persuaded that Hungary's position as the Party initially
in breach deprived it of a right to terminate the Treaty in response to Czechoslovakia's material
breach," the President joined the majority in imposing the resuscitated agreement on the parties.
Id. at 85 (Declaration of President Schwebel).
104.

See supra note 89.

105. A comparative survey of this presumption includes:

M. Ann Hayward, Interna
tional Law and the Interpretation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Uses and
Justifications, 23 U. W. ONT. L. REV. 9, 13-16 (1985) {Canada); Gulmann, supra note 82, at
36 (Denmark); Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't, (Ex parte Brind) [1991] 1
A.C. 696, 760 {H.L.), and Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers LTD [1992] 3
W.L.R. 28, 44 (Eng. C.A.) {United Kingdom); Jochen A. Frowein, Federal Republic of Ger
many, in EFFECT OF TREATIES, supra note 81, at 63, 68-69 {Germany); Darusz v. Union of
India, 92 I.L.R. 540 (Sup. Ct. 1993) {India); C.A. 25/55, 145/55, 148/55, Custodian of Absen
tee Property v. Samra, 10 P.D. 1825, 1831, 22 I.L.R. 5 {1956) {Israel); Gaja, supra note 91, at
100-101 {Italy); Minister of Defence {Namib. v. Mwandinghi), 91 I.L.R. 341 (High Ct. 1993)
{Namibia); State v. Ncube, 90 I.L.R. 580 {Sup. Ct. 1992) {Zimbabwe). For a critical view of
this rule from a constitutional law perspective, see Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy
Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86
GEO. L.J. 479 (1998).
106. See United States v. PLO, 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); W. Michael Reisman,
An International Farce: The Sad Case of the PLO Mission, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 412, 429-32
(1989).
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interpretation that stultified its aim and prevented an international
conflict. Of course, Congress can overcome this hurdle by stating ex
plicitly its breach of a treaty obligation. But only in extreme cases not even in the PLO case - would Congress issue such an admission.
The combined outcome of these rules insulates many governments
from domestic challenges that would require them to renege on treaty
obligations against their will. The smaller groups are assured that
their gains will last, in one form or another, until the larger groups
within all relevant states simultaneously agree to modify their treaty
obligations. They also know, as we shall see in the next section, that
when it is in their interests to commit an international breach, their
government will not be effectively constrained from doing so. In other
words, the norms pave a one-way street: governments can hardly be
forced to renege on treaty obligations, but when they choose, they can
hardly be prevented from doing so. This is exactly what small groups
that invest in controlling the governments want.
C.

Providing Escape Clauses for Unilateral Defections

Most international treaties are "relational," in that they create re
lations between parties that extend well into the future.107 During the
life of such treaties, conditions often change, and therefore state nego
tiators take pains to ensure that treaty obligations provide efficient
mechanisms for adjusting to these changes. Governments prefer to
retain control over their reaction to such changes instead of conferring
authority on international institutions to determine what adjustments
are necessary. Governments ensure their discretion through ambigu
ous texts, insufficient monitoring tools, or suboptimal enforcement
mechanisms. The small domestic groups warrant this discretion as
their interests may be affected by strict future compliance with treaty
obligations. Thus, as George Downs and David Rocke have ex
plained, international trade law includes weak enforcement norms to
accommodate the uncertain future demands of domestic interest
groups.108 Parties design enforcement norms strong enough to encour
age signatories to observe the agreement most of the time, thereby
preventing, for example, trade wars, "but low enough to allow politi
cians to break the agreement when interest group benefits are

107. On the characteristics of "relational contracts," see IAN R MACNEIL, THE NEW
SOCIAL CoNTRACT (1980); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Con
tracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981); Ian R Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations:
Its Shortfalls and the Need for a "Rich Classificatory Apparatus," 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 1018 (1981);
Ian R Macneil, The Many Futures of Contract, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974); Alan Schwartz,
Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies,

21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992).
108. DO\VNS & ROCKE, supra note 73, at 88. Downs and Rocke extend their observa
tion to other kinds of international agreements in which states desire the ability to respond
periodically to domestic interests. Id. at 88-104.
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great."109 Retaliatory measures will often fail to target only the group
responsible for the breach and therefore externalize the costs of
breach onto other domestic groups.U0
Note that escape clauses that offer impunity for the defecting gov
ernment may not be equally available to a legislature that wishes to
renege on the treaty. First, the relevant escape clauses are more likely
to reflect small group interests. Justifications of the larger groups for
breach, such as the interest in sound environmental policies or work
ers' conditions, are less likely to permit defection with impunity. Sec
ond, the legislature is less capable than the government of monitoring
other states' violations, a key tool - if only rhetorical - for justifying
one's own breach to both the international community and interna
tional tribunals. Lastly, because breaches are followed immediately by
international negotiations and possibly adjudication, the government
is more capable than the legislature in finessing the consequences of
breach (or externalizing the costs onto the larger public). Due to the
relative edge enjoyed by the government over the legislature, the for
mer is more likely to initiate unilateral defections from international
obligations, whereas the latter will likely remain inactive.
Interested small domestic groups also prefer not to seek the courts'
protection against their government's decision to renege on its treaty
obligations; their political leverage provides sufficient guarantees
against the need to do so. In fact, they are more interested in seeing
that domestic courts remain uninvolved and refrain from demanding
compliance of a reneging government; and courts live up to the expec
tation. National courts have faced numerous petitions for injunction
challenging domestic policies - whether statutes or administrative
decisions - on the grounds that they were incompatible with general
international lawm or specific treaty obligations.112 Parties have like
wise brought suits challenging the domestic recognition of foreign

109. Id. at 77.
110. The recent U.S.-E.U. trade wars and the unilateral measures which were adopted,
see supra note 61 and accompanying text, shows that the WTO regime still conforms to this
theory despite its stricter 1994 judicial dispute resolution procedures.
111. This is notably the case with efforts to invoke international human rights standards
in domestic courts. See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE
L.J. 2347 {1991). For comparative perspectives, see Anne Bayefsky & Joan Fitzpatrick, In
ternational Human Rights Law in United States Courts: A Comparative Perspective, 14
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 {1992) and Byal Benvenisti, The Influence of International Human Rights
in Israel: Present and Future, 28 ISR. L. REV. 136 {1995).
112. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155 {1993) (rejecting claim that re
patriation of Haitian refugees at sea violated the U.N. Convention on Refugees); United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (finding U.S. government's forced abduction
of a Mexican citizen to be compatible with the U.S.-Mexican extradition treaty); Harold
Hongju Koh, The "Haiti Paradigm" in United States Human Rights Policy, 103 YALE LJ.
2391 (1994) (discussing Haitian Sales case). For a similar decision by a chamber of the Ger
man Federal Constitutional Court, see the decision of July 17, 1985 (EuGRZ 1986, 18, at 20)
(Federal Republic of Germany).
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governments' acts, such as the expropriation of private property
abroad, which international law regarded as illegal.113 National courts
have generally reacted negatively to such claims, as judges have in
variably chosen to defer to the executive.114 Courts in virtually all de
mocracies have shown great ingenuity by inventing an arsenal of
"avoidance doctrines" that enable them to align their judgments along
governmentally perceived national interests.115 They sidestep ques
tioning the international legality of the executive's activities and the
fruits of its negotiations.116 In some jurisdictions, notably that of the
U.S., courts allow the executive lawfully to violate international cus
tomary law.117 It is also widely accepted that the executive may termi
nate treaties unilaterally without parliamentary or judicial review.118
Paradoxically, some have attributed the prevalent deferential atti
tude to the lack of democratic legitimacy inherent in international
treaties and other norms.119 Because the formulation of international
treaties and custom is itself democratically deficient, courts do not

113. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (applying act of
state doctrine to expropriation of private assets of U.S. citizens in Cuba).
114. See Benvenisti, supra note 92.
115. See supra note 96.
116. Thus, in the Rhine Pollution case discussed above, see French Pollution Permit
Case, supra note 53, at 298, the French Conseil d'Etat upheld the permission to pollute as
lawful, finding that international norms (including applicable treaties) did not proscribe it.
For criticism of the decision, see Alexandre Kiss, 2-3 REVUE JURIDIQUE DE
L'ENVIRONNEMENT, 307-09 (1986) (commentary following the case).
117. See Garcia-Mirv. Meese, 788 F2d 1446, 1454-55 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that cabinet
officers, in addition to the President, may violate international customary law); see also Louis
Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1568-69 (1984);
Agora: May the President Violate Customary International Law?, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 913 (1986).
118. On the U.S. law, see REsTATEMENT, supra note 86, § 339(b) ("Under the law of
the United States, the President has the power . . . to make the determination that would
justify the United States in terminating or suspending an agreement because of its violation
by another party or because of supervening events, and to proceed to terminate or suspend
the agreement on behalf of the United States."). On German law, see Frowein & Hahn, su
pra note 91, at 363 (stating that treaty termination power is considered to be within the ex
clusive domain of the executive). In those countries that do not require parliamentary ap
proval of treaty, executive termination power is obvious.
119. The democratic deficiency debate continues to stir scholarly attention. Compare
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human
Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319 (1997), Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position,

110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997), and Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary In
ternational Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665 (1986), with Harold Hongju Koh, Commentary: Is
International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998), and Gerald L. Neu
man, Sense and Nonsense about Customary International Law: A Response to Professors
Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997). On the probable influence of the
democracy argument on the court, see RICHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC
COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER (1964); Lea Brilmayer, International Law in
American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 YALE L.J. 2277 (1991); and Thomas M. Franck,
The Courts, the State Department and National Policy: A Criterion for Judicial Abdication,
44 MINN.

L. REV. 1101 (1960).
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view international obligations as an integral part of the law and hence
outside the proper scope of judicial scrutiny. This explanation, how
ever, proves too much. It only highlights the undemocratic conse
quences of the courts' hesitation: international treaties, which often
entail significant domestic ramifications, bypass the courts' muster be
cause they also bypassed regular legislative procedures. Executive
power remains supreme.
The courts' deference is not, however, motivated by a concern for
democratic legitimacy. Instead, it stems from the same global interju
risdictional competition that affects the other branches of government.
An assertive court that is ready and willing to enforce international
norms upon recalcitrant governments (which, for example, refrain
from imposing environmental standards on polluting industries) en
hances the sanctions for dodging international obligations and in
creases their cost.120 Potentially affected firms may therefore decide to
relocate to another jurisdiction in which courts are more compliant.
For the same reason, national courts have little incentive to impinge
upon the laissez-faire underpinnings of international law or to develop
stringent standards governing the activity of locally based companies
that operate abroad. A judicial assertion, for example, that state par
ties to a bankrupt international organization are responsible for its
outstanding obligations to third parties, might lead other international
organizations to establish headquarters in jurisdictions where such re
sponsibility is not recognized.121 Enforcing strict domestic standards
on domestic actors operating abroad, such as Union Carbide122 or
Texaco,123 may prompt them and others to leave the jurisdiction and
set up shop near their competitors. National courts, as much as na
tional legislatures and governments, appreciate this threat and join the

120. For a discussion on the importance of escape mechanisms for domestic interest
groups, see infra Part IV.
121. See The ITC Litigation, supra note 48 (refusing to recognize the responsibility of
state parties for the debts of the international organization).
122. Gasses released from a pesticide plant owned by Union Carbide India (owned by
Union Carbide Corp., a U.S. company) killed about 2100 people and injured over 200,000.
Lawsuits were brought by both individual claimants and the government of India in the U.S.
District Court of the Southern District of New York against the U.S. parent. The court dis
missed the cases for forum non conveniens. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disas
ter at Bhopal, India in December, 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), modified, 809 F.2d
195 (2d Cir. 1986). Despite the Indian government's assertion that Indian courts were un
able to cope with the magnitude of this claim, the court opined that litigating in India would
better respect Indian sovereignty and judicial self-sufficiency. See id. at 867. The real un
derlying issue was, of course, the possibility of obtaining the higher U.S. standards of dam
ages including punitive damages.
123. Two class action suits filed in U.S. courts by Ecuadorian and Peruvian citizens
against Texaco alleged that Texaco had severely polluted rainforests and rivers in Ecuador
and Peru as a result of its oil exploitation activities in Ecuador. The suits were again dis
missed for forum non conveniens and reasons of international comity. See Aquinda v. Tex
aco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated, 157 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 1998); Sequihua v.
Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
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race to the bottom. They behave like any other actor in a prisoner's
dilemma scenario as they pursue one dominant strategy: protect do
mestic interests. Only when international guarantees, such as Article
177 of the Treaty of Rome, provide judges with assurances that all of
their foreign colleagues will cooperate, can this timidity be over
come.124 Until such guarantees are assured, potential domestic defec
tors can rely on a compliant national court.
This thesis also extends to courts of regional organizations, such as
the European Court of Justice (the judicial organ of the European
Union), where one would expect a similar partisan attitude when
dealing with the external relationships of the organization. And in
deed, the European Court of Justice has dismissed a number of chal
lenges to the European Commission's and Council's discriminatory
policies regarding the "Banana War" involving the E.U., Central
American countries, and the United States.125
The three characteristics of treaties discussed in this Part - small
group domination of the negotiation and ratification of treaties, the
lack of opportunities for the larger public to challenge existing treaty
obligations, and the opportunities for governments and small groups
to evade specific clauses with relative impunity - combine to ensure
small groups a significant edge over other domestic groups in securing
their sectarian interests. The next Part examines the consequences of
this predicament.

IV. DOMESTIC INTEREST GROUPS AND GLOBAL MARKET FAILURES
Having identified the mechanisms by which small domestic groups
control interstate negotiations, this Part analyzes the consequences of
their dominant position. To do so, it may be helpful to contrast the
transnational conflict paradigm with the much simpler Westphalian
paradigm of unitary state actors. The contrast will serve to highlight

124. See Eyal Benvenisti, Judges and Foreign Affairs: A Comment on the Institlll de
Droit International's Resolution on 'The Activities of National Courts and the International
Relations of Their State,' 5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 423, 426 (1994). Article 177 ensures that the in
terpretation and implementation of Community law by national courts will not diverge from
the policies adopted by the central judicial body, the European Court of Justice. Treaty of
Rome, March 25, 1997, art. 177, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 76-79.
125. See Case C-73/97 P, French Republic v. Comafrica SpA & Dole Fresh Fruit Eur.
Ltd. & Co., 1999 ECJ CELEX LEXIS, at *285 (January 21, 1999); Case C-280/93, Germany
v. Council of the E.U., 1994 E.C.R. 1-4973. For criticism of this case (and on the Chiquita
Italia case, Case C-469/93, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Chiquita Italia SpA,
1995 E.C.R. 1-4533), see Meinhard Hilf, The Role of National Courts in International Trade
Relations, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 321, 338-43 (1997). But see Case C-122/95, Germany and
Belg. v. Council of the E.U., 1998 E.C.R. 1-973, in which the court annulled part of the
Council's decision approving the conclusion of a trade agreement with third states because it
discriminates between different exporters of bananas to the E.U. Note, however, that at the
time of judgment, the relevant agreement was under challenge at the WTO. See WTO Ap
pellate Reports, supra note 61 (WfO Appellate Body's decision in the banana dispute).
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three different global challenges: efficiency, democracy, and social
welfare.
The efficiency challenge tests the traditional role of the state in
providing essential resources to its population and managing the coun
try's natural resources efficiently and sustainably. It is becoming in
creasingly difficult for states to succeed in these tasks without enlisting
long-term commitments to cooperate from other states. When key
domestic actors - bureaucrats, politicians, and the business sector pursue interests at odds with the long-term interests of the general
constituency, it decreases both the possibility of effective international
cooperation and the prospects for ample provision and optimal alloca
tion of resources. The democracy challenge addresses the inadequacy
of existing domestic and international processes to give voice to vot
ers' preferences and safeguard their interests. Finally, the social wel
fare challenge addresses the threat to the ideal of the welfare state
posed by a global system that promotes a race to the bottom.
A.

The Efficiency Challenge: Tragedies of the Global Commons

This Section argues that in a true Westphalian world of 200-some
actors, many collective action problems would have been resolved
endogenously. That these problems persist suggests not only that the
Westphalian vision is flawed, but that transnational conflicts of inter
est are themselves responsible.
Let us assume a world of 200 or so actors, as the Westphalian
model wants us to imagine. In this world, states act upon their "na
tional interest," which the negotiators internalize. This world must
address numerous collective action failures, such as the failure to in
crease labor standards, the failure to protect against global warming,
or the failure to prevent ozone depletion. In this world, a significant
number of these failures will remain unresolved, but many other
problems - those involving fewer states - would find a satisfactory
solution in the form of spontaneous interaction among the relevant ac
tors.
Unitary state actors would still find it difficult to overcome situa
tions where a relatively large number of states, or all of them, are in
volved and in which many have conflicting incentives.126 Global
warming, for example, creates divergent incentives for different states
because some of them actually stand to gain from the expected
warming and moistening of their region, while others will suffer a dis
proportionate loss due to desertification. Their diverging incentives

126. Conflicting incentives can be expected to exist between developed and developing
countries with respect to the desirability of, for example, antitrust laws and high labor stan
dards. See Guzman, supra note 2 (antitrust); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the
Global Economy: Four Approaches to Transnational Labor Regulation, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L.
987, 996-97 (1995) (labor).
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may preclude an endogenous provision of the public good in the inter
national sphere.127
But the Westphalian world would have resolved quite successfully
another type of collective action problem: the regulation of interna
tional common pool resources (ICPRs), which are shared by only a
small number of states but from which other states can be excluded.128
Rivers, lakes, transboundary oil fields, and specific fish stocks or migra
tory birds, are all examples of ICPRs. With ICPRs, the shared interest
in ensuring long-term enjoyment of the resource, combined with the pos
sibility of excluding outsiders from access to it, provide adequate incen
tive for the limited number of insiders to coordinate their activities and
thereby avert a tragedy of their commons.129 Recent game-theoretic
models and sociological studies have shown that, under similar condi
tions involving groups of individuals, long-term endogenous coopera
tion can, and will, emerge without reliance on external enforcement
mechanismsY0 In a world of states as unitary players, states' coopera
tion in ICPR management should be no less successful than cooperation
among individuals in local commons, providing for an optimal and sus
tainable use of the resource in question. Even when states have different
priorities and capacities, one could expect Coasean deals in which a well
off neighbor buys the less wealthy neighbor's cooperation.131

127.

See SANDLER, supra note 57, at 100.

128. This is based on the definition of Common-Property Resource (CPR). See RUSSELL
HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 19 (1982); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING TIIE COMMONS 3033 (1990); TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION 5-7 (1992); MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE
POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION 3 (1987).
129. The number of riparians may influence the tendency to cooperate. When there are
more riparians, coordination is more difficult to attain. The costs of coordinating actors' activi
ties and monitoring actors' performance are likely to increase as more formal methods for coor
dination and monitoring are required. See HARDIN, supra note 128, at 182-85; SANDLER, supra
note 128, at 48; TAYLOR, supra note 128, at 105; EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE
EMERGENCE OFNORMS 47 (1977).
130. Game-theoretic models suggest that such collective action can emerge without an
external enforcement agency through conditional cooperation based on the actors' choice of
a friendly "tit-for-tat" strategy.
See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF
COOPERATION (1984). These models are supported by impressive and convincing evidence on
the emergence of collective action among numerous individual actors, mostly in indigenous
communities, that has been accumulated and analyzed in recent years. See OSTROM, supra note
128, chs. 3-4; Robert Wade, The Management of Common Property Resources: Collective
Action as an Alternative to Privatisation or State Regulation, 11 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 95
(1987). For collective action in agriculture and water management, see Byal Benvenisti,

Collective Action in the Utilization of Shared Freshwater: The Challenges of International
Water Resources Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 384, 385-87 (1996), and Barton H. Thompson, Jr.,
Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81 CAL. L. REV. 671 (1993). See also
WILLIAM M ADAMS, wASTING TIIE RAIN 42-50, 70-99 (1992) (discussing dryland agriculture
and indigenous irrigation in Africa).

131. Compare the decision of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs suggesting that it
would be prepared to engage in a dialogue with "tax havens [that] have chosen to be heavily
dependent on their tax industries" and to take account of the "need to encourage the long
term development of these economies." OECD, supra note 66, para. 16, at 10-11.
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So why in our real world, dominated by transnational conflicts of
interest, does ICPR cooperation fail miserably? The main reason lies
in the heterogeneous character of the state. For collective action to
sustain itself, the involved actors must share an interest in an indefi
nite reiteration of their cooperative moves. This occurs only when
they place sufficiently high value on their indefinite future gains they must have a sufficiently large "shadow of the future. "132 Herein
lies the major obstacle to cooperation among states, which are hetero
geneous rather than unitary actors. While the general population
within each state has a keen interest in long-term cooperation to en
sure long-term resource availability and intergenerational equity,
other domestic actors, namely bureaucrats, politicians, and the busi
ness sector, tend to discount the long-term national benefits of coop
eration :while preferring short-term, partisan gains. Bureaucrats my
opically focus on their personal conditions and the budgets they
manage during their careers in office.133 Politicians (unless organized
in closely knit political parties with long-term interests in survival)
usually have an even shorter perspective, which extends little further
than the coming elections. Finally, the private sector, which can rather
cheaply relocate its activities and investments, has very little interest in
the future of specific ICPRs (unless the ICPRs are unique, as in the
case of sturgeon fish in the Caspian sea, and the company in question
has not diversified its activities). This is especially true with respect to
developing countries, whose long-term welfare is of little consequence
to the typical foreign investor. Environmental tragedies, such as the
major recent dumping of oils into the rivers of Ecuador and Peru,134
which irrevocably affect the lives of indigenous peoples, occur because
the multinational corporation that is directly responsible, and the local
politicians and bureaucrats who are indirectly responsible, act ration
ally. The multinational company has a long-term interest in its in
vestments, not in the future of a particular ICPR. Domestic politicians
and bureaucrats pursue their own short-term goals. Their long-term
externalities are born by the general population (including, of course,
future generations), and particularly by the underrepresented indige
nous peoples that live in the affected region.
The transnational conflict paradigm therefore provides an impor
tant insight into the causes of particular global collective action fail
ures. When ICPRs are involved, diverging long-term perspectives
within states, not conflicts among states, are responsible for many
tragic outcomes.

132. AXELROD, supra note 130, at 126 (suggesting that indefinite reiteration is the key
to adopting cooperative strategies among actors in a prisoners' dilemma situation).
133. For a discussion of the different motivations of bureaucrats, see supra notes 18 and
22.
134. See supra note 123 (discussing the class actions against Texaco).
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The Democratic Challenge: Ratification as a Democratically
Deficient Process

Public choice literature is replete with analyses of the failure of
democratic systems to reflect the actual preferences of the individual
voter. The transnational conflict paradigm complements these analy
ses by showing an even greater decline in voter power as a result of

small-group domination of international politics and an increasingly
interdependent world economy.
Smaller interest groups enjoy a disproportionate influence over the
state's external policies through their involvement in the process of
treaty negotiation and ratification. This process permits very little
public scrutiny of the negotiators' acts and omissions because ratifica
tion does not allow for amendments; thus many alternatives necessar

ily remain unexplored.135 Even the domestic debate on ratification of
ten remains clouded because the access of the public and legislators to
information concerning international negotiations is invariably lim
ited. Little is known about the options offered and discussed, as nego
tiators have little incentive to provide accurate information on their
performance to the general public.136 Deficient public scrutiny of trea
ties, as well as the lack of judicial enthusiasm to scrutinize them,137 se
verely handicaps democratic safeguards for ensuring the executive in
ternalization of voter preferences.
There exist no institutional
oversight mechanisms to protect less successful domestic interest
groups, or the interests of future generations.138
The globalization of markets in the last two decades has further
marginalized the voice of the voters. Due to the lower costs of relo
cating investments and activities, producers, investors, and employers
have fewer commitments to specific jurisdictions. They can therefore
fully exploit the global prisoner's dilemma game. As a result of their
growing exit options, the voice of larger domestic groups, such as labor
unions139 and environmentalists,140 has declined considerably.

135. See supra Section III.A.
136. Though negotiators are responsible for what they have agreed upon through the
treaty-ratification process, they are rarely rebuked for their missed opportunities simply because
those opportunities often remain unknown to the public. See DOWNS & ROCKE, supra note 73,
ch. 3.
137. See supra Section III.C.
138. Protection of less successful domestic interests underpins Ely's theory of judicial
review. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). For a discussion of the in
creasing efforts to reduce such capture through NGO participation and monitoring of negotia
tions, see infra notes 171-176 and accompanying text.
139. Labor unions have lost voice both in terms of wages and social benefits and in
terms of security of the workplace. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 178-90 (1995) (discussing means to assuage labor
dislocation problems subsequent to implementation of an open-trade policy); Stone, supra
note 126 at 996-97.
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Another aspect of modem development further exacerbates the
democratic market failure. With the growing capacity to appropriate
and use resources which traverse national boundaries, many decisions
are no longer within the sole control of national institutions. A single
nation cannot usually unilaterally implement its policies with respect

to the use of a river which is shared with other riparians, or with re
spect to the regulation of mineral extraction from a shared mine. In
stead, regional cooperation, even joint decisionmaking, is required to
prevent an imminent race to the bottom. The more cooperation is re
quired, the less autonomy national institutions and their constituencies
have in making their decisions.141
C.

The Social Welfare Challenge: The Threatened Welfare State

The global prisoner's dilemma, presented by the relatively costless
relocation of businesses across the globe, pressures national legisla
tures to reduce standards for the protection of consumers, employees,
and the environment. Lower taxation on capital and caps on public
spending (as a result of the openness of monetary markets) require
governments to limit their budgets, which in many cases means less
public spending on social welfare.142 The race to the bottom precludes
collective action measures that would promote better labor stan
dards,143 protect consumers144 and the environment, and allocate
shared resources in an optimal and sustainable way.145 Local and mul
tinational firms exploit these failures and externalize a substantial part
of their costs on both their fellow citizens and foreign communities.
This outcome can be explained by reference to the transnational con
flict paradigm. Under the Westphalian paradigm, with state actors
pursuing the national interest in promoting welfare, collective action
would have stood a better chance of succeeding.

140. Cf. Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race
to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210
{1992) (critiquing race-to-the bottom arguments in the environmental context).
141. See DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER {1995).
142. See, e.g., Geoffrey Garrett, Capital Mobility, Trade, and the Domestic Politics of
Economic Policy, in INTERNATIONALIZATION AND DOMESTIC PoLmcs 79 {Robert 0.
Keohane & Helen V. Milner eds., 1996). On the impact of monetary markets on govern
ments' budgets, see Stephan Haggard & Sylvia Maxfield, The Political Economy of Financial
Internationalization in the Developing World, in INTERNATIONALIZATION AND DOMESTIC
PoLmcs, supra, at 209.
143. See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 139, at 187-90 (arguing that increased trade
should be linked to compliance with international rights norms).
144. As to the possibility of setting up global antitrust regulations, see Guzman, supra
note 2 (suggesting a low probability for such action).
145. See Benvenisti, supra note 130.
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TowARD A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

The transnational conflict paradigm shows that global market fail
ures are often the result of transnational conflict among interest
groups rather than international conflict among unitary states. The
Westphalian system ignores this reality, and helps perpetuate inter
group externalization of costs, and as a result, inefficient, nonsustain
able, and inequitable outcomes. Moreover, it does disservice to the
idea of democratic governance.
This Part offers new tools to accommodate those conflicts better
characterized by the transnational conflict paradigm. It calls for a new
understanding of the opportunities provided by regional and interna
tional institutions to serve as instruments for managing transnational
conflicts. Transnational institutions can serve to reduce small-group
capture and provide for equitable and sustainable collective action.
Opportunities for public participation in the decisionmaking processes
within these institutions will offer effective voice for the public and
new meaning for democratic participation in the management of
global commons.
A.

Transnational Institutions: A Definition

A more structured and transparent treaty negotiation and deci
sionmaking process can significantly limit the opportunities of domes
tic interest groups, bureaucrats, and politicians to pursue short-term
sectarian goals to the detriment of the larger society and future gen
erations. It is my claim that transnational institutions would be capa
ble of responding to a great number of global collective action prob
lems in ways that not only promote efficiency, but democracy and
social justice as well. With these purposes in mind, and for reasons to
be explained below, I define transnational institutions as treaty-based
decisionmaking procedures for the coordination of policies with re
spect to a specific activity (such as trade, taxation, or antitrust) or a
specific shared resource. Such institutions would include, at the very
least, permanent bodies and permanent processes for the collection of
relevant data, its assessment and dissemination to the public, and the
formulation of publicly stated and reasoned policies (in the forms of
opinions, recommendations, or decisions) on the basis of that data. As
part of their data processing, such institutions should employ mecha
nisms for monitoring compliance of the various domestic actors with
the institution's policies, also by providing access and soliciting input
from NGOs representing a variety of interest groups. Such mecha
nisms will reduce informational asymmetries and allow a more mean-
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ingful role for representatives of the larger domestic interest groups,
such as consumers, employees, and environmentalists. In short, trans
national institutions would mirror the better types of contemporary,
domestic administrative agencies on the global level, while preserving
and respecting the still-cherished principle of state sovereignty.
Transnational institutions would not replace governments or domes
tic administrative agencies. Their decisionmaking process will function
in tandem with parallel domestic processes and guarantee regard to (all)
national interests. For example, domestic administrative agencies in
charge of their state's environmental protection could exchange informa
tion and coordinate policies with the relevant transnational institution in
charge of a transboundary natural resource. Other domestic agencies
might serve as the institution's long arm in domestic policy implementa
tion. Domestic laws and institutions could be used to sanction violators
of transnational rules. Transnational institutions would not need inde
pendent police powers in order to be effective. Their provision of infor
mation, formal and accessible decisionmaking procedures, and monitor
ing go a long way toward an efficient and more democratic allocation of
competences and resources.146 The ratification of the treaty establishing
the institution, judicial review of the institutions' decisions (where bind
ing) or the recommending nature of other decisions, and ultimately the
possibility of withdrawal as a weapon of last resort, could operate as
formal guarantees for protecting national interests.
The definition of transnational institutions is stricter than that of in
ternational institutions used by international relations theorists: this
definition highlights the specific characteristics of the decisionmaking
process as a tool for reducing interest-group capture.147 As explained in
the next sections, these characteristics provide an environment for the
evolution of conditional cooperation that can resolve collective action
problems and respond to the democracy and social justice challenges of
this age of globalization.

146. For an early assessment of the achievements of institutions in protecting the envi
ronment, see generally INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH (Peter M. Haas et al. eds., 1993).
147. According to Stephen D. Krasner's widely accepted albeit rather loose definition,
international institutions are "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and deci
sion-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of inter
national relations." Stephen D. Krasner, Structured Causes and Regime Consequences: Re
gimes as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed.,
1983). On different types of international institutions, see generally ORAN R. YOUNG,
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (1989). For a categorization of regimes according to the
process by which they have been established (spontaneous, negotiated, imposed), see Oran
R. Young, Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall ofInternational Regimes, 36 lNT'L ORG. 277
(1982). See also Stephan Haggard & Beth A. Simmons, Theories of International Regimes,
41 INT'L 0RG. 491, 493-96 (1987) (defining "regime").
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Institutions and the Emergence of Collective Action

Critics might question the utility of transnational institutions by sug
gesting that such institutions, being composed of decisionmakers from all
participating states, merely reproduce the problems inherent in typical
negotiating scenarios between state negotiators.148 What meaningful
role, then, would institutions play? Those following the Westphalian
paradigm of unitary state actors, which ignores the problems of small
interest-group capture, have viewed institutions - with their independ
ent bureaucracy, scientific personnel, or courts - as a means to reduce
information asymmetries and other transaction costs among member
states, thereby facilitating more efficient negotiations and enforcement
mechanisms.149 But institutions matter because they operate in a politi
cal environment more aptly described by the transnational conflict para
digm. Institutions, as defined earlier, transform a largely unstructured
and veiled negotiation process, followed by an insufficiently informed
ratification process where the deal is presented as a "take it or leave it"
option, into a well defined, widely accessible, and transparent decision
making procedure.150 They reduce small-interest capture by allowing
wide representation and providing scrutiny of the negotiation process
throughout its elaboration.
Channeling deliberations through the transnational institution
changes the opportunities and relative control that different actors representative of various domestic interests, politicians, and bureaucrats
- have in the decisionmaking process.151 The structured institutional
decisionmaking process counterbalances the relative edge smaller do
mestic groups have in obtaining information and exerting leverage dur
ing the negotiation and ratification process.152 The institution eliminates

148. The debate concerning the effectiveness of IOs as opposed to negotiations has
haunted IR scholars since the 1980s. See Lisa L. Martin & Beth A. Simmons, Theories and
Empirical Studies of International Institutions, 52 INT'L 0RG. 729, 742-49 (1998).
149. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal Inter
national Organizations, 42(1) J. CONFLICTREs. 3 (1998). Ever-closer interstate cooperation
was explained by referring to the influence of "epistemic communities" (i.e., experts sharing
common practices and policies), see Symposium, Knowledge, Power, and International Policy
Coordination, 46 INT'L ORG. 1 (1992), and to the interaction within "governntent networks,"
see Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International Law and International Relations Theory: A
New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367, 390-91 (1998).
150. Witness the slow but steady move of E.U. institutions toward transparency, concur
rent with the enlargement of their powers and the need to address public concerns with the
democracy deficit. See CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 91, at 368-71; VEERLE DECKMYN &
IAN THOMPSON, OPENNESS AND TRANSPARENCY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (1998).
151. For a similar claim with respect to NGO participation in the World Trade Organi
zation procedures, see Daniel C. Esty, Linkages and Governance: NGOs at the World Trade
Organization, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 709 (1998); Daniel C. Esty, Non-governmental
Organizations at the World Trade Organization: Cooperation, Competition, or Exclusion, 1
J. INT'LECON. L. 123 (1998).
152. On the impact of asymmetric information, see supra note 11 and accompanying
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informational asymmetries by disseminating data collected and assessed
within the institution. It further enhances public participation by in
volving representatives of the larger domestic groups in the decision
making process, allowing them to comment on suggested policies and of
fer alternative plans.153 Eliminating the subsequent ratification would
reduce the potential of smaller groups to concentrate their capture ef
forts in the national institutions. Instead of ratification, public scrutiny of
the institution's decision will focus on its stated reasons for its decisions.
Transnational institutions, in contrast to negotiators and more akin to
administrative agencies or even courts, would be required to state rea
sons for their actions.
An institutionalized process will do more than merely alter the rela
tive leverage of conflicting groups. The personal composition of its em
ployees and officials can, if properly attended, also contribute signifi
cantly to an environment that permits less capture.
Because the
structured decisionmaking process should rely on the accumulation and
assessment of data, decisions would involve less-politicized personnel.
Scientists would process the data, thereby providing common ground
that politicians could not avoid in their deliberations.154 These institu
tions would have their own bureaucracy who would in tum identify the
institution's success and reputation with their own. As transnational butext.
153. The preamble to the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters adopted in Aarhus, Den
mark on June 25, 1998 by member states of the Economic Commission for Europe and other
European states, emphasizes these points:

Recognizing that, in the field of the environment, improved access to information and public
participation in decision-making enhance the quality and the implementation of decisions,
contribute to public awareness of environmental issues, give the public the opportunity to
express its concerns and enable public authorities to take due account of such concerns,
Aiming thereby to further the accountability of and transparency in decision-making and to
strengthen public support for decisions on the environment . . . .

UN Doc. ECE/CEP/43 (1998), available at <http://www.un.org/Deptsffreaty/collection/not
publ/27-13eng.htrn>.
154. This has proven crucial even in the context of Canada-U.S. relations, in which "in
formal intelligence gathering [by low level officials] helps to provide an early warning of im
pending issues, and permits actions before issues become too politicized." David G. LeMar
quand, Preconditions to Cooperation in Canada-United States Boundary Waters, 26 NAT.
REsOURCES J. 221, 232 (1986). For an analysis of the Canada-U.S. International Joint
Commission, see infra text accompanying notes 159-160. This has also been the experience
in the development of the Antarctic Treaty System.
See LORRAINE M. ELLIOT,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PROTECTING THE ANTARCITC 43-44 (1994);
Jonathan Blum, The Deep Freeze: Torts, Choice of Law, and the Antarctic Treaty System: Is

It Adequate to Regulate or Eliminate the Environmental Exploitation of the Globe's Last Wil
derness?, 14 Haus. J. INT'L L. 597, 673 (1992). Scientific cooperation, however, depends
upon shared interests. Ostensibly "scientific" arguments can sometimes be advanced to
support noncooperative policies. On the use and misuse of science-based risk assessment in
support of states' adoption of strict trade policies under the WTO 1994 Agreement on Sani
tary and Phytosanitary Measures, see Robert Howse, Democracy, Science and Free Trade:
Risk Regulation on Trial at the World Trade Organization (1999) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
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reaucrats inevitably try to extend their powers, they will naturally push
toward more intensified cooperation.155 The information disseminated
to the general public will constrain the range of options open to the poli
ticians on the board, and operate as check on their choices.156
These mechanisms will provide a voice for all affected interest
groups. As the literature on the emergence of cooperation in the man
agement of common property resources suggests, institutions that pro
vide for equal voice are more likely to resolve the collective action
problems they face.157 In addition to voice, such institutions will be able
to hold domestic officials accountable for their acts or omissions by
drawing the domestic public's attention to ineffective domestic regula
tion of private activities.
These institutions would not need independent enforcement powers.
Given the transnational nature of the conflicts, enforcement could re
main the private initiative of nonstate participants acting within the do
mestic polity and using domestic forums. Well-informed NGOs could,
for example, respond to free-riding attempts by other substate actors
(and the governments' compliance with such attempts) by staging do
mestic public opinion campaigns, thereby exerting effective political
pressure on incumbent governments and members of the legislature.
They could also, although probably with less success,158 petition domestic
courts for judicial review. In short, NGOs would be able to act equally
as effectively as they do in response to entirely domestic policies.
The U.S.-Canada International Joint Commission, entrusted with
management of the rivers shared by the two states, is an example of
effective regional collective action.159 In only four of the 110 applica-

155. In its recent proposal, "The IJC and the 21st century," the U.S.-Canada IJC sug
gested establishing permanent IJC international watershed boards to manage additional
major transboundary basins. See !JC to Further Examine Watershed Approach (press re
lease, Nov. 23, 1998) <http://www.ijc.org/news/h2oshed1198.html>.
156. See INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTII, supra note 146, at 14 ("If there is one key variable
accounting for policy change, it is the degree of domestic pressure in major industrialized democ
racies, not the decision-making rules of the relevant international institution."); see also id. at
399-400.
157. See OSTROM, supra note 128, ch. 6. For examples of a successful institution pro
viding voice to both producers and consumers of water, see Thompson, supra note 130, at 68793. For successful water institutions in ancient societies, see Benvenisti, supra note 130, at 385ITT.

158. On the reluctance of courts to interfere in issues which constrain governmental ac
tivities beyond national borders, see discussion supra Section 111.C.
159. The IJC consists of three appointees from each side. It has authority to approve all
works potentially affecting the level or flow of the U.S.-Canada boundary waters. The IJC
also has a dispute resolution function that has never been used. See Treaty Relating to
Boundary Waters between the United States and Canada, January 11, 1909, U.S.-Gr. Brit.,
36 Stat. 2449. For an analysis of its mandate, see Stephen J. Toope & Jutta Brunnee, Fresh
water Regimes: The Mandate of the International Joint Commission, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. LAW 273 (1998). For an assessment of its contribution, see Patricia K. Wouters, Allo
cation of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses: Efforts at Codification and
the Experience of Canada and the United States, 30 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 43 (1992).
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tions for decisions before 1987 were there any dissenting opinions by
Commission members, and in only two of them did the dissent follow
national lines. Both governments adopted more than three-quarters
of the Commission's decisions.160 Another example is the Finnish
Swedish Frontier Rivers Commission established in 1 977, whose deci
sions have always been unanimously accepted, despite the fact that
only a majority vote is necessary.161 In both cases, information and
voice have been sufficient substitutes for independent enforcement
measures.
The International Labour Organisation is an example of a global
organization whose effectiveness is enhanced by wide participation.
Deliberations follow the concept of "tripartism": each state's delega
tion to all of the deliberative bodies is comprised of two government
representatives, one representative for each the employers and the
workers.162 The latter are instrumental in negotiating the standards
and implementing them within the national jurisdictions.163
This is not to suggest that transnational institutions would be free
of challengers to their authority. In states where small groups enjoy
relatively high political leverage, one could expect less commitment to
compliance. Deep-seated animosity among rival communities might
also overshadow rational considerations and hinder cooperation. But
as collective action failures grow more dramatic and individuals more
fully grasp their repercussions, popular demand for effective transna
tional institutions will eventually produce them.
C.

Institutions and Democracy

The structured decisionmaking process in transnational institutions
also responds to the democratic challenge, providing three essential
democratic tools. First, and perhaps most important, the improved in
formation institutions provide to voters counterbalances their inherent
deficiency in monitoring the domestic institutions' performance. It
exposes both domestic policies and international engagements of the
government to voter scrutiny. By informing the voters on their gov-

160. See Wouters, supra note 159, at 78-79 n.186 (citing R.B. Bilder, When Neighbours
Quarrel: Canada-U.S. Dispute Settlement Experience (working paper, 1987)).
161. The Commission consists of tlrree appointees from each country. It has authority
to approve works affecting the flow and quality of the shared water resources and to adjudi
cate disputes among individual users. For a comprehensive account of the commission, see
Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The Finnish-Swedish Frontier Rivers Commission, 5 HAGUE Y.B.
INT'LL. 33, 44 (1992).
162. Constitution of the ILO, June 28, 1919, Art. 3(1), 49 Stat. 2712, 225 Consol. T.S.
378-79, available at ILO, ILO Const, (visited Oct. 11, 1999), <http://www.ilo.org/public/ eng
lish/overview/iloconst.htm>.
163. See DE LA CRUZ ET AL., supra note 41, at 10 ("Tripartism is the real strength of the
ILO."); see also Samson, supra note 41, at 151-52.
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ernment's performance, transnational institutions increase account
ability and offer citizens a more meaningful voice.
Second, open access to the institutions' procedures gives domestic
populations an opportunity to influence regional and global policies
that affect their interests: it provides a voice without a vote. A cynic
might criticize such an imperfect voice as politically meaningless, and
indeed it could be. But when strong cross-cultural links exist between
communities, voices will matter even when no vote supports them.164
The German Constitutional Court expressed a strong belief in the ef
fectiveness of such a voice in approving Germany's ratification of the
Maastricht Treaty:

If democracy is not to remain a formal principle of accountability, it is
dependent upon the existence of specific privileged conditions, such as
ongoing free interaction of social forces, interests, and ideas, in the
course of which political objectives are also clarified and modified, and as
a result of which public opinion moulds political policy. For this to be
achieved, it is essential that both the decisionmaking process amongst
those institutions which implement sovereign power and the political
objectives in each case should be clear and comprehensible to all, and
also that the enfranchised citizen should be able to use its own language
in communicating with the sovereign power to which it is subject.165
This statement may reflect only the Court's assessment of the political
environment in the European Union; but it might also represent an
emerging trend to take seriously the deliberative process that precedes
the actual taking of votes. According to the argument, the process of
reasoning and persuasion that precedes the actual vote is effective in
eliminating Pareto-inferior outcomes and providing for more equita
ble distribution of resources. Such a deliberative process would le
gitimize the decision taken and thus ensure greater compliance.166 At

164. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 503, 522-28 (1995) (presenting the diverse opportunities that exist for exerting
political influence across borders within liberal states).
165. Maastricht Treaty 1992 Constitutionality Case, EuGRZ 1993, 429 (Fed. Const. Ct.
F.R.G.), translated in 33 l.L.M. 388, 420 (1994) [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty Case) (cita
tions omitted) {finding constitutional Germany's signing of the Maastricht Treaty).
166. See James D. Fearon, Deliberation as Discussion, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
(Jon Bister ed., 1998). This trend has in recent years been developed following Jilrgen
Habermas's THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACI10N (vol. 1, 1984; vol. 2, 1987). For
background on this trend, see generally the contributions in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY,
supra; JOSEPH M. BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
AND AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT {1994); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION {1993); Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in THE
GOOD POLITY: NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STATE 17 (Alan Hamlin & Philip Pettit
eds., 1989); David M. Estlund, Who's Afraid of Deliberative Democracy? On the Strate
gidDeliberative Dichotomy in Recent Constitutional Jurisprudence, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 1437
{1993); Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: Republican-Oriented Legal Theory and
the Moral Foundation of Deliberative Democracy, 82 CAL. L. REV. 329 (1994); Amy Gut
mann, The Disharmony of Democracy, in NOMOS XXXV: DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY 126
(John W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro eds., 1993); Michel Rosenfeld, Law as Discourse: Bridg
ing the Gap Between Democracy and Rights, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1163 {1995). It is beyond
44, 56
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the very least, the requirement that transnational institutions offer
reasons for their decisions will increase the accountability of deci
sionmakers, just as the reasoning of court opinions serves as a con
straint on judicial power.167
The third democratic tool consists of removing specific matters
from interest groups' influence. Venerable democratic institutions
such as the courts and central banks are designed to be independent
from the immediate influences of the voters and political pressures.
To the extent that such insulation from politics is legitimate, transna
tional institutions can make it happen. Thus, for example, the recent
European monetary integration, which entailed a complete loss of
sovereign control over monetary policies, is compatible with democ
racy. In approving the transfer of power to the new institution, the
German Constitutional Court accepted the government's "scientifi
cally proven" argument that such a move was necessary to "ensure
that the currency is not vulnerable to pressure groups or to holders of
political office seeking re-election. "168 Institutions that collect and as
sess information concerning, for example, the shared environment or
other ICPRs, inform, but also constrain, the choices open to politi
cians. Any sound democratic theory must recognize the crucial role of
scientific input to political decisionmaking.169

the scope of this Article to enter into the debate about the merits of this theory. For critical
views, see, for example, David Austen-Smith, Strategic Models of Talk in Political Decision
Making, 16(1) INT'L POL. SCI. REV. 45 (1992); James A. Gardner, Shut Up and Vote: A Cri
tique of Deliberative Democracy and the Life of Talk, 63 TENN. L. REV. 421 (1996). Suffice
it to say that those who subscribe to the theory would find in transnational institutions a fo
rum for deliberation.

167. This constraint is particularly potent when judges consider overruling prior deci
sions. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865-66 (1992) (opinion of
O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.) ("The Court must take care to speak and act in ways
that allow people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for them, as grounded
truly in principle, not as compromises with social and political pressures having, as such, no
bearing on the principled choices that the Court is obliged to make. Thus, the Court's le
gitimacy depends on making legally principled decisions under circumstances in which their
principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation.").
168. Maastricht Treaty Case, supra note 165, at 439. The German Federal Constitutional
Court reasoned:
This modification of the principle of democracy, which is designed to secure the confidence
of making payment that is placed in a currency, is justifiable, because it takes account of the
special factor, established in the German system and also scientifically proven, that an inde
pendent central bank is more likely to protect monetary value, and therefore the general
economic basis for national budget policy and private planning and disposition, while main
taining economic liberty than are sovereign governmental institutions.
Id. at 439-40.

169. See, for example, Justice Breyer's suggestion to establish (domestic) institutions
composed of experts to manage health and environmental risks, rather than politicians who
thus far have failed to address such risks appropriately. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING
THE VICIOUS CIRCLE (1993); see also RISK VS. RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH
AND THE ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995).
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Forging Institutions

The above discussion demonstrates that great attention be paid to
the procedural safeguards within transnational institutions. It also sug
gests that institutions must give greater recognition to the involvement of
NGOs, the modem tribunes of the large domestic groups. It explains
why NGO participation is not a matter of grace, but both a matter of
right (the democratic right of participation in government) and of inter
est (obtaining optimal outcomes without externality effects).
So far, despite the increasing recognition of NGOs' positive con
tribution to negotiation and decisionmaking processes,170 attempts to
give NGOs formal status have thus far been unsuccessful. Thus, for
example, attitudes in the World Trade Organization (WTO) towards
increased transparency and NGO participation have remained nega
tive.171 The recent United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses,172 adopted after dec
ades of negotiations, failed to emphasize the importance of institutions
and refused any role for NGOs, despite the insistence of some members
and scholars.173 A number of international lawyers have given schol
arly support for NGO intervention in international decisionmaking
processes, basing these claims in the language of rights.174 But a for-

170. One recent example is the role played by the NGOs during the negotiations at the
Rome Conference on the International Criminal Court. See Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT'LL. 22, 23 (1999).
171. See Esty, supra note 151 {both articles); Philip M. Nichols, Participation of Nongov
ernmental Parties in the World Trade Organization: Extension of Standing in World Trade
Organization Disputes to Nongovernment Parties, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 295 (1996)
{discussing the issue of standing for nongovernmental entities); Arie Reich, From Diplo
macy to Law: The Judicization of International Trade Relations, 17 J. INT'L L. Bus. 775, 84748 {1997) (discussing the democratization of WTO procedures); Brian J. Schoenborn, Public
Participation in Trade Negotiations: Open Agreements, Openly Arrived at?, 4 MINN J,
.

GLOBAL 'TRADE 103 {1995) (arguing in favor of increased public participation in interna
tional trade negotiations).
172. May 21, 1997, 36 1.L.M. 700 {1997).
173. See Stephen S. McCaffrey, Sixth Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/427/Add.1 (1990) {report of Special Rapporteur).
For criticism, see Gunther Hancll, The International Law Commission's Draft Articles on the Law
of International Watercourses (General Principles and Planned Measures): Progressive or Retro
gressive Development of International Law?, 3 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 123, 124-29
{1992); Constance D. Hunt, Implementation: Joint Institutional Management and Remedies in
Domestic Tribunals (Articles 26-28 and 30-32), 3 COLO. J. INT'LENVTL. L. & POL'Y 281, 284-87
(1992); and Sergei V. Vinogradov, Observations on the ILC's Draft Rules: "Management and
Domestic Remedies," 3 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 235, 23541 (1992).
174. See Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM.
J. INT'L L. 259 {1992); Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization, International Institutions, and the
Erosion of National Sovereignty and Democracy, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1944, 1967-68 (1997).
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mal recognition of their role and importance has so far been given
only in nonbinding declarations.175
Of course, the establishment of transnational institutions presents
a collective action problem, which could itself entail attempts to insti
tutionalize opportunistic gains.176 As soon as the larger domestic
groups across political boundaries realize the stakes involved, pres
sures to reform the law and create responsive institutions should be
expected.177 The process of designing transnational institutions must
itself include the participation of the wider public, both through repre
sentative NGOs and the dissemination of accessible information - it
will not be an easy task. A delicate balance must be struck between
governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental representa
tion, thereby ensuring that narrow interests, including those advanced
by NGOs, cannot predominate.178

175. The 1992 Rio Declaration notes that "[e]nvironmental issues are best handled with
the participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level." Declaration of the UN Con
ference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992, Principle 10.
Chapter 18 of Agenda 21 calls for active public participation in shared freshwater manage
ment, which includes not only the provision of a right of hearing to oppose plans that could
be detrimental to certain individuals or groups, but more generally, requires states to aim at
"an approach of full public participation, including that of women, youth, indigenous people
and local communities in water management policy-making and decision-making," Agenda
21, Principle 18.9(c), reprinted in 4 AGENDA 21 & THE UNCED PROCEEDINGS 357, 363
(Nicholas A Robinson ed., 1992) [hereinafter AGENDA 21], and suggests the "[d]evelopment
of public participatory techniques and their implementation in decisionmaking." Agenda 21,
Principle 18.12(n), reprinted in AGENDA 21, supra, at 366. See also Ellen Hey, Sustainable Use of

Shared Water Resources: The Need for a Paradigmatic Shift in International Watercour.ses Law,
in THEPEACEFULMANAGEMENTOF'TRANSBOUNDARYREsOURCES 127, 133 (Gerald s. Blake
et al. eds., 1995). Although the New York Convention mentions neither of these ideas and
maintains the stiff separation between the international and the domestic levels by providing
only for state-to-state notification and consultation, there are scholars who find it possible to
derive such participatory rights from more basic notions of civil and political rights, see Alan
Boyle, The Role of International Human Rights Law in the Protection of the Environmen� in
HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 43, 59 (Alan E. Boyle &
Michael R Anderson eds., 1996), and principles of general environmental law. See Boyle, su
pra, at 59-63; James Cameron & Ruth Mackenzie, Access to Environmental Justice and Proce
dural Rights in International Institutions, in HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra, 129, at 134-35; Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, Environmental
Rights in the European Union: Participatory Democracy or Democratic Deficit?, in HUMAN
RIGHTS APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra, 109, at 112-20.
176. For such gains within the international aviation markets, see John E. Richards,

Towards a Positive Theory of International Institutions: Regulating International Aviation
Markets, 53 INT'L ORG. 1 (1999) (demonstrating capture gains by domestic groups in estab
lishing international regulatory institutions in the international aviation market).
177. One radical response to these challenges is the establishment of a "cosmopolitan
democracy," based on an international constitution which provides for separation of differ
ent institutional powers and individual rights. See HELD, supra note 141, at 267-83.

,
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VI. CONCLUSION
Lowering costs of relocating investments and activities, combined
with declining East-West political pressures, have spawned transna
tional economic activity in which investors and employers are no
longer committed to a specific territory or community. The rise of
multinational corporations and the globalization of the world econ
omy have increased the interdependency of national markets; new
technologies have increased the potential for unilateral appropriation
of global commons, and thus raised the stakes involved in influencing
governmental decisionmaking. As a result, smaller domestic groups
are uniquely positioned to exploit the resulting global prisoner's di
lemma; as a result, the relative political power of larger domestic in
terest groups continues to decline.
Contemporary voters face a process of ever-growing marginaliza
tion. First, they are marginalized by the growing interdependency of
global markets, which increases the bargaining position of smaller
domestic interest groups. Second, they are marginalized because deci
sions regarding resources - water, clean air, fisheries - no longer
depend solely on their vote, but to a growing extent on interstate co
operation with governments sharing access to those resources. These
parallel developments have undermined the principles behind the
democratic state; the right to participate in elections and influence de
cisionmakers, although increasingly gaining recognition across the
globe, in fact provides right-holders much less than it purports to
promise. These and future generations of voters must bear economic
externalities their governments do not care or are unable to prevent.
The transnational conflict paradigm identifies the domestic mecha
nisms that shape national attitudes towards transnational cooperation
and demonstrates the crucial role of transnational institutions in coor
dinating national policies. It also explains why relatively few effective
institutions have been established thus far.
The laissez-faire environment of the globalization process cannot
remain unchallenged. Although larger groups within society find it
more cumbersome to join forces, they ultimately succeed. The rise of
the welfare state is a clear example. Following Olson's logic, 178 the in
ternational community can anticipate larger interest groups - con
sumers, employees, and environmentalists - to grow more assertive
in world politics and create pressure to impose global restrictions on
trade and resource management.179 It is thus necessary to design ap-

178. See OLSON, LOGIC, supra note 9; OLSON, RISE AND DECLINE, supra note 15.
179. See, e.g., HELD, supra note 141 (calling for "cosmopolitan democracy"); McGinnis,
supra note 27 (discussing the possible emergence of internationally centralized regulatory
control of international trade).
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propriate procedures and institutions - not to replace the state sys
tem, but to complement and respond to its deficiencies. Designing
structures for a more involved global constituency must be done with
the utmost care; the progression from city-states to nations to a global
community has reached its limit. As opposed to previous attempts to
design political institutions, new global institutions will leave few exit
options.180

180. See McGinnis, supra note 27, at 924.

